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Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of
Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime
Amy J. Sepinwall*
The BP oil spill and financial crisis share in common more than just profound tragedy
and massive clean-up costs. In both cases, governmental commissions have revealed
widespread wrongdoing by individuals and the entities for which they work. The public
has demanded justice, yet the law enforcement response in both cases has been
underwhelming. In particular, no criminal indictments have been sought for any of the
corporations responsible for the Macondo oil-rig explosion or for the Wall Street
banks involved in the financial meltdown.
This governmental restraint reflects a deep-seated ambivalence about corporate
criminal liability. Though scholars have been debating the justifiability of prosecuting
and punishing corporations since the doctrine’s inception just over 100 years ago,
virtually no progress has been made by either side. Thus, we have devastating instances
of corporate crime and no good justification for prosecuting and punishing
corporations.
The Article seeks to diagnose the reason for the widespread consternation about the
doctrine of corporate criminal liability. It then advances a new theoretical foundation
for the doctrine.
More specifically, the Article seeks to justify corporate criminal liability by arguing not
that the corporation deserves to be punished for its wrongdoing but instead that its
members do. Thus the Article conceives of corporate criminal liability as a way of
targeting the corporation’s officials, who are blameworthy just in virtue of their role
within the corporation. The Article ends by identifying a series of corporate sanctions
that reflect the rationale for corporate criminal liability advanced here.

* Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, Wharton, University
of Pennsylvania. Ph.D., Philosophy, Georgetown University, 2010; J.D., Yale Law School, 2004; M.A.,
McGill University, 1999; B.A., McGill University, 1997. For very helpful comments, I am grateful to
Albert Alschuler, Ian Ayres, Bill Bratton, Pamela Bucy, Jill Fisch, Tamar Frankel, Bill Laufer, David
Luban, Jonathan Macey, Eric Orts, Gregg Polsky, Ed Rock, Andy Siegel, Alan Strudler, and Robin
West, as well as audiences at Georgetown, University of North Carolina School of Law, Wharton, and
the 2011 Northeast Regional Scholarship and Teaching Development Workshop. This Article was
selected for the Academy of Legal Studies in Business 2010 Invited Scholars Colloquium and
benefited greatly from feedback received there. Joyce Shin provided excellent research assistance. All
errors that remain are my own.
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Introduction: A Century-Long mistake?
Between the financial meltdown, unsafe manufacturing practices
2
that have led to unprecedented numbers of product recalls, and an oil

1. Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1359, 1359 (2009) (comparing corporate criminal punishment with the ancient legal
practices of deodand and Frankpledge); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred
Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1329, 1329 (2009) (arguing there exists no
theoretical justification for corporate criminal liability).
2. See, e.g., FDA May Prosecute Executives over Violations, Chi. Tribune, Aug. 25, 2010,
(News), at 43; Parija Kavilanz, Drug Recalls Surge, CNNMoney.com (Aug. 16, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/16/news/companies/drug_recall_surge/index.htm
(describing
the
skyrocketing number of drug recalls over the last year, including a four-fold increase in recalls relative
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spill that constituted the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history, we
appear to have marked the centennial of corporate criminal liability with
a spate of corporate wrongdoing that by itself seems to serve as sufficient
4
justification for the doctrine’s existence. Yet commentators continue to
5
revile the doctrine of corporate criminal liability, deeming it “ridiculous,”
a violation of a “basic premise of criminal justice that crime requires
6
7
personal fault,” and a “weed.” Punishing the corporation has been
deemed worse than the institution of Frankpledge, whereby all members
8
of a group were held responsible for the crime of one of them.
Furthermore, the moral theory underpinning corporate criminal liability
9
10
and
has been termed “tribal,” “fundamentally incoherent,”
11
“destructive.” Where corporate crime occurs, these critics conclude, it is
only the individuals responsible for the crime’s commission who deserve
prosecution and punishment.
Yet if corporate criminal liability really does warrant the
vituperative reactions that scholars evince, those outside the academy
appear not to have noticed. For example, in the wake of the BP oil-rig
explosion, which led to the deaths of eleven rig workers as well as untold
damage to the Gulf of Mexico, the public has demanded not just that BP
executives be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter but also that the
12
corporation itself receive a “death sentence.” And when, in May 2010,

to the previous year).
3. See, e.g., Shadi Bushra, America’s Worst Environmental Disaster in History: A Reason to Sink
Climate-Change Legislation?, Stanford Progressive, June 2010.
4. The case affirming corporate criminal liability for specific-intent crimes was decided in 1909.
See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–94 (1909). Prior to that
case, U.S. courts had permitted corporate convictions only for crimes of nonfeasance and misfeasance.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339, 339 (1854).
5. Alschuler, supra note 1, at 1359.
6. State v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 587 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1998). See generally Joel Feinberg,
Collective Responsibility, 65 J. Phil. 674 (1968) (noting that collective responsibility appears to violate
the fault principle, according to which one may be held responsible for an injury only if one
proximately caused the injury by acting in a faulty manner).
7. Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 21 (1957)
(“Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.”).
8. Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and
Deodand, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 307, 312 (1991). Alschuler goes on to argue that, at least with Frankpledge,
“the group could avoid punishment by capturing the flesh-and-blood wrongdoer and delivering him or
her to the authorities.” Id.
9. Daniel Warner, An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations 65–66 (1991); cf.
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 25–28 (1961) (referring to the tribalist assignment
of collective responsibility as primitive).
10. Hasnas, supra note 1, at 1333.
11. Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrine for Destruction: The Case of Corporate Criminal Liability,
17 Managerial & Decision Econ. 381, 381 (1996).
12. Thom Hartmann, Halliburton & BP—Is It Time for the Corporate Death Penalty?,
Huffington Post (May 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thom-hartmann/halliburton-bp---is-itti_b_560955.html.
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Johnson & Johnson recalled 136 million bottles of children’s medicines—
its fourth recall in less than a year—government officials threatened
criminal action against the company itself, citing “systemic” failures and
13
a “culture of mediocrity.”
In short, societal responses to corporate crime suggest that the sum
of the wrongdoing in a corporate offense may be greater than its parts:
We are keen to see the individual perpetrators of the crime brought to
14
justice, but our outrage frequently extends beyond them. It is this
surplus outrage—this remainder—that likely prompts calls for criminal
15
action against the corporation itself.
But is the public thirst for corporate punishment no more rational
16
than the Ancients’ raising their fists against the volcano? Scholars who
have sought to account for public sentiment on this score argue that the
corporation is an entity that can bear criminal responsibility in its own
17
right. For them, the corporation itself deserves to be prosecuted and
punished where it has transgressed.
In this way, supporters of corporate criminal liability respond to the
doctrine’s critics by engaging them not on the merits of the doctrine but
instead on a prior question: whether the corporation is a moral agent or,
equivalently, whether the corporation is the kind of being that can bear
moral, and hence criminal, responsibility. Yet, as we shall see, there is
deep disagreement over just which capacities it takes to be a moral agent
in the first place, to say nothing of the controversy over whether the

13. See, e.g., Susan Heavey, Storm over J&J’s Child Drug Recall Only Grows, Reuters.com (May
27, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64P3UD20100527.
14. Cf. Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33 Brook. J.
Int’l L. 955, 967 (2008) (citing a study reporting cases in which juries convicted corporations while
acquitting each of the individual defendants, and speculating that “[s]uch verdicts suggest a theory of
liability in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts”).
15. The notion of a moral remainder, first introduced by Bernard Williams, typically arises in
cases where an agent confronts two simultaneous and conflicting moral demands and, though she
chooses the more pressing one, the one she has had to forsake does not thereby get cancelled out;
instead, it persists as a kind of residue or remainder. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical
Papers 1973–1980, at 61 (1981). As should be clear, here I employ the term to signify cases in which
what is left over is not some unfulfilled obligation but instead some undistributed responsibility.
16. Cf. Susan Wolf, The Legal and Moral Responsibility of Organizations, in Criminal Justice:
Nomos XXVII 267, 268 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (analyzing the rationale
behind characterizing corporations as “full-fledged, irreducible moral agents”). The Supreme Court
apparently has decided that public outrage can be irrational not only in criminal cases but also in civil
cases where juries award punitive damages “grossly” in excess of compensatory damages. See Ryan J.
Strasser, Note, Punitive Damages Caps: A Proposed Middle Ground After Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 19 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 773, 778, 783 (2010). For example, in a challenge to the punitive
damages award imposed upon Exxon for the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Supreme Court held that
punitive damages could not exceed a one-to-one ratio with compensatory damages, and it reduced the
punitive damages award from $5 billion to $287 million, the amount that the jury had awarded in
compensatory damages. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008).
17. See infra Part I.

Sepinwall_63-HLJ-411 (Do Not Delete)

January 2012]

1/24/2012 6:07 PM

GUILTY BY PROXY

415
18

corporation possesses the requisite capacities. It is no surprise, then,
that the critics and supporters of corporate criminal liability have been
going around in circles for the hundred years since the doctrine’s
19
inception.
There is, however, a way out of this mire. I shall argue that we do
not need to decide questions of the corporation’s moral status in order to
defend corporate criminal liability. Instead, when the corporation
commits a crime, its senior officers and directors are necessarily
blameworthy, whether or not they participated in the crime, recklessly
20
21
tolerated it, or negligently allowed it to occur. And I shall contend that
we can best make sense of the societal reaction to corporate crime in
light of the blameworthiness of these corporate officers and directors:
We rage against the corporation that commits a crime because we intuit
that its officials deserve blame, in addition to whatever culpability the
crime’s individual perpetrators bear. It is in giving voice to this response
that the doctrine of corporate criminal liability finds it most compelling
22
justification.
In short, the Article advances a retributivist defense of corporate
criminal liability—one that seeks to justify prosecuting and punishing the
corporation as a way of targeting the senior officials whose very position
within the corporation legitimately subjects them to blame.
Correspondingly, the Article proposes sanctions against the corporation
that can orient the criminal law’s sting to these officials.
Importantly, the account of responsibility advanced here holds
whether corporate criminal liability is understood along the federal
doctrine of respondeat superior or the Model Penal Code (MPC)
standard. Briefly, under federal criminal law, a corporation can be found
criminally liable for any criminal act undertaken by an employee, so long
18. See infra Part I.A.3.
19. See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 Harv.
L. Rev. 1477, 1477–78 (1996); Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate
Liability, 82 Ind. L.J. 411, 418 (2007) (“[N]early every scholarly article on this topic . . . makes a
concession to the effect that ‘the doctrine of corporate criminal liability has developed . . . without any
theoretical justification.’”). See generally Edward B. Diskant, Note, Comparative Corporate Criminal
Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Corporate Criminal Procedure,
118 Yale L.J. 126 (2008).
20. See Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (1985) (making a high managerial authority’s reckless
toleration of a criminal offense one among several alternative predicates for a finding of corporate
criminal liability).
21. In this way, the justification for corporate criminal liability to be advanced here is distinct
from the responsible-corporate-officer doctrine, which seeks to prosecute individual corporate officials
when their negligent oversight contributed to the corporation’s crime. I discuss the responsiblecorporate-officer doctrine in greater detail below. See infra note 33.
22. As Lawrence Friedman notes, “[O]nly criminal liability is understood against the background
of social norms, codified by the criminal law, as conveying the particular moral condemnation that
expressive retribution contemplates.” Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 833, 854 (2000).

Sepinwall_63-HLJ-411 (Do Not Delete)

416

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/24/2012 6:07 PM

[Vol. 63:411

as the act was (a) within the scope of the employee’s agency and (b) to
23
the benefit of the corporation. The MPC, by contrast, requires a
corporate official’s involvement in the crime before the crime can be
attributed to the corporation. More specifically, a corporation will be
held criminally liable for an act of its employee only if “the commission
of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or
24
employment.”
These two doctrines specify the conditions under which it is
appropriate to impute the criminal act of some employee (or employees)
to the corporation. I begin not from the question of whether the
corporation has committed a crime—again, a question that these two
doctrines variously answer—but instead from the question of who bears
25
responsibility when the corporation has committed a crime. The Article
23. Thus, for example, in New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, the case
inaugurating corporate criminal liability for malfeasance, the Supreme Court held that corporations
could be held criminally liable “not . . . because the principal actually participates in the malice or
fraud, but because the act is done for the benefit of the principal, while the agent is acting within the
scope of his employment in the business of the principal.” 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909); see also United
States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 309–10 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming corporate conviction for a
criminal offense committed by a low-level employee in direct contravention of corporate policy).
24. Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (1985). Elsewhere, the MPC allows for corporate criminal
liability where
the offense is a violation or the offense is defined by a statute other than the Code in which
a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears and the conduct is
performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the
scope of his office or employment.
Id. § 2.07(1)(a). The MPC further allows for corporate criminal liability where “the offense consists of
an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law.”
Id. § 2.07(1)(b). The MPC also allows a “defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of
evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of
the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.” Id. § 2.07(5). In the text accompanying
this footnote, I focus on the provision requiring culpability on the part of an officer or director of the
corporation because that provision functions as the counterpart to the federal criminal liability
standard.
25. There is a widespread conflation of these two questions among commentators, who frequently
assume that once they can find a basis upon which to ascribe some employee’s criminal act to the
corporation, then the corporation can rightly be said to deserve punishment. See, e.g., Justice Ian
Binnie, Legal Redress for Corporate Participation in International Human Rights Abuses, 38 Brief 44,
46 (2009) (discussing corporate complicity in international human rights abuses); see also Yedidia Z.
Stern, Corporate Criminal Personal Liability—Who Is the Corporation?, 13 J. Corp. L. 125, 142 (1987)
(arguing that corporate liability could be based on corporate personal actions). But this confuses two
senses of desert. First, one deserves punishment only for those crimes to which one bears a culpable
connection. But second, and more globally, one deserves punishment only if one is the kind of being
that qualifies for moral agency in the first place. By way of analogy, children and those who are
psychologically impaired can commit crimes, but we often—rightly—think that they do not deserve
punishment, in virtue of their moral immaturity or incapacity. By the same token, the commentator
who succeeds in convincing us that a corporation has committed a crime has won only half the battle;
she must still convince us that the corporation is a suitable object of retribution. For reasons I go on to
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answers the latter question by arguing that, in addition to the individual
perpetrators, the corporation’s officers and directors bear responsibility
whenever the corporation has committed a crime. And the Article seeks
to justify corporate criminal liability as an appropriate response to the
responsibility borne by these officers and directors, to whom I refer
26
collectively as “corporate officials.”
A handful of other scholars also have sought to defend corporate
criminal liability as an effective way of targeting the corporation’s
members. Yet these scholars focus on the deterrent value of corporate
criminal liability. They propose that, ex ante, the doctrine can enhance
27
internal monitoring within the corporation; ex post, an indictment or
conviction against the corporation will be used by corporate officials to
ferret out and, where appropriate, transmit sanctions to the individual
28
wrongdoers. These scholars do not argue that the doctrine might be
justified on retributive grounds, as a means of casting blame upon the
29
corporation’s officials, as this Article does.

articulate in Part I, I do not believe that any commentator has yet succeeded on this front. I offer my
own efforts to this end in Part II.
26. See, e.g., Blackstone v. Cashman, 860 N.E.2d 7, 18 (Mass. 2007) (“[A] corporate director,
whatever the frequency of his involvement in day-to-day operations, has an important interest in and
responsibility for the conduct of business by the company’s corporate officers.”). On the account I
shall go on to advance, the corporate official’s responsibility is grounded in her fiduciary relationship
to the corporation, and both officers and directors stand in a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Robert C.
Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business
55, 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (“[B]oth officers and directors are
‘fiduciaries’ with respect to the corporation and its stockholders.”); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III &
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 Bus. Law.
215, 217 (1992) (“[M]ost authorities suggest that, as a general proposition, corporate officers owe the
corporation the same fiduciary duties as do directors.”).
27. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 1, at 1390 (describing the ways in which instrumental
proponents of corporate criminal liability support the doctrine in light of its (purported) ability to
monitor the corporation ex ante).
28. See, e.g., Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability 20–22
(1993) [hereinafter Fisse & Braithwaite, Corporations] (arguing that prosecution and conviction of
the corporation can provide an impetus for the corporation to discipline its culpable members, and
that the corporation is better placed to ferret out these individual wrongdoers than is the state); John
C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 412 (1981) (“[T]o deter corporate crime more
effectively, one might sensibly begin by exploring the principal fears and interests of the manager, and
then match the consequences of a criminal conviction to them.”); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The
Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability,
11 Sydney L. Rev. 468, 482–88, 510–12 (1988) [hereinafter Fisse & Braithwaite, Allocation] (arguing
both that the corporation deserves punishment in its own right, and that punishing the corporation can
be an effective response “to the problem of non-prosecution of corporate managers,” where the
corporation is prompted, or even ordered, to transfer the sanctions imposed upon it to the individual
offenders).
29. Larry May comes closest to mounting a retributivist defense of corporate criminal liability on
the basis of the corporate executive’s culpability, but his account applies only where the corporate
executive has engaged in a culpable act or omission. Larry May, Negligence and Corporate Criminality,
in Shame, Responsibility and the Corporation 137, 146–49 (Hugh Curtler ed., 1986). In this way, his
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The account advanced here is not intended to serve as an apology
for corporate criminal punishment as it is currently imposed. Critics are
right to note the ways in which corporate punishments frequently befall
30
the most innocent and least powerful members of the corporation. They
are also right to note the ways in which the threat of corporate criminal
prosecutions has been inappropriately leveraged as a tool to sniff out
31
individual perpetrators, and how that threat in fact prompts the
corporation to sacrifice expendable, and possibly innocent, employees in
32
an effort to mitigate, or escape, its own liability. But improperly
targeted sanctions and undue prosecutorial pressure are not features
endemic to corporate criminal liability. In any case, to the extent that the
account advanced here justifies corporate criminal liability as a means of
targeting the corporation’s officials, it shifts the focus of blame, and the
corresponding sanctions, from lower-level employees to directors and
officers. At the same time, although the account aims to draw out the
ways in which corporate officials are blameworthy, it does not seek to
argue that they warrant individual prosecution, as the responsible33
corporate-officer doctrine does.

account, as he recognizes, functions as a philosophical defense of the MPC formulation for corporate
criminal liability, or the responsible-corporate-officer doctrine. Id. at 148–49, 138–39. In any event,
May favors individual over corporate prosecutions. Id. at 154–55. For all of these reasons, his project is
significantly different from mine.
30. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 28, at 401; John Hasnas, Foreword to Corporate Criminality:
Legal, Ethical and Managerial Implications, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1269, 1269 (2007) (suggesting that
enhanced prosecution for white-collar crime “risks causing harm to innocent parties”). For a casespecific reaction of this kind, consider the response of Arthur Andersen’s senior management to the
Department of Justice’s decision to prosecute the entire firm, rather than just the Houston office: they
saw it as unjustly “imposing a death penalty on the whole organization.” Jenifer K. Nii, Andersen’s
S.L. Workers Loyal, Deseret News, Mar. 23, 2002, at D12.
31. See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
Waiver Problem, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 295, 295, 306 (2008); see also Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry
Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants,
44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 53, 96 (2007). But cf. Julie R. O’Sullivan, Does DOJ’s Privilege Waiver Policy
Threaten the Rationales Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine? A
Preliminary “No,” 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1237, 1238–39 (2008).
32. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 28, at 412.
33. The responsible-corporate-officer doctrine allows for individual prosecutions of high-ranking
officers where they have failed adequately to supervise or control subordinates who commit crimes as
a result of the oversight failure. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Park, the doctrine
“hold[s] criminally accountable the persons whose failure to exercise the authority and supervisory
responsibility reposed in them by the business organization resulted in the violation complained of.”
421 U.S. 658, 670–71 (1975); see Michael Willats, Comment, Death by Reckless Design: The Need for
Stricter Criminal Statutes for Engineering-Related Homicides, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 567, 581–82 & nn.99,
102 (2009) (reviewing the circumstances under which case law and statutes will allow for prosecution
of corporate officers). Thus, the predicate for conviction is a finding that these officers are personally
at fault in virtue of their own delinquency. In this way, the doctrine represents no departure from an
individualist conception of responsibility. By contrast, I argue that corporate officials may be
blameworthy even where they did not operate with a culpable mental state.
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The arguments of this Article unfold against extensive debate over
the relative merits of civil or criminal law responses to corporate
34
wrongdoing, and that debate in turn rests significantly on a series of
35
questions about the proper relationship between efficiency and desert.
If the doctrine’s critics are right, the corporation is a fictitious entity and
so cannot be said to deserve anything. On their accounts, then, we should
36
consider the matter entirely from the perspective of efficiency. But
public sentiment proceeds otherwise, and the considerations marshaled
here amount to a reconstruction of the public’s response—one that aims
to make respectable what these critics heretofore have derided. As such,
one goal of the Article is to secure a role for retribution in the response
to corporate crime. While I do not seek to determine the relative
ordering or weights of efficiency and desert, I anticipate that the
efficiency-based arguments against the doctrine will be cabined to a
significant extent if I can make good on the claim that retribution has a
37
role to play in our response to corporate crime.

34. Compare Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. Legal Stud. 833, 835 (1994), Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Legal
Stud. 319, 323 (1996), and Khanna, supra note 19, with Coffee, supra note 28, at 424–25, 447 (noting
the uniquely stigmatizing effect of the criminal law), William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty
Minds, 43 Emory L.J. 648, 716–18 (1994), and William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate
Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1285, 1309–1310
(2000). See generally Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of
Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295 (2001) (arguing that the law of white-collar crime contains
an appealing mix of civil and criminal sanctions that together serve the social goals of moral
condemnation, deterrence, prevention, restitution, acceptance of responsibility, and so on, and that
our response to street crime should involve a civil and criminal mix, too). In a stream of recent work,
Dan Markel has advanced a deep and thoughtful retributive justification for punitive damages, which
he conceives as intermediate between civil and criminal sanctions. See generally Dan Markel,
Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 239
(2009).
35. See generally Kip Schlegel, Just Deserts for Corporate Criminals (1990); Dan M. Kahan,
Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. Legal Stud. 609 (1998).
36. Cf. Kahan, supra note 35, at 610, 622 (arguing that efficiency itself is underspecified and ought
to include considerations not just of material costs and benefits but also of the social good resulting
from possibilities to discharge indignation at wrongdoing); Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment:
Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 109,
111–24 (2010) (arguing that, as the deterrence rationale for corporate criminal liability came to
dominate the debate, the justifiability of the doctrine waned).
37. The strongest implication for the reductionist arises on a Kantian conception of responsibility,
according to which retribution is lexically prior to efficiency. See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate
Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally Liable?, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1239, 1278 n.243, 1283 (2000). As such, corporate criminal liability would be justifiable no matter how
inefficient. Cf. Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age 205 (2000) (“I
argue that we have ethical reason to treat shareholders as liable for their company’s deficiencies in
meeting its reparative duties to accident victims. (I leave open the question of whether countervailing
economic or procedural reasons override the ethical argument.)”). Critics of corporate criminal
liability recognize the significance of retribution and marshal a denial of the corporation’s moral
agency as a starting premise of their arguments. For them, it is only because the corporation does not
deserve to be held responsible that the debate about corporate criminal liability can focus exclusively

Sepinwall_63-HLJ-411 (Do Not Delete)

420

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/24/2012 6:07 PM

[Vol. 63:411

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I first aims to diagnose the
seeming intractability in the debate about corporate criminal liability by
exposing a dogmatic precept that both parties to the debate share. In that
precept, the justifiability of the doctrine turns on the question of whether
the corporation is the kind of entity that can be held morally, and hence
criminally, responsible. I argue that this question is likely unanswerable.
While the standstill might prompt us to abandon the doctrine altogether,
I argue that doing so would leave us with a surplus of blame, for which
there would then be no target. I conclude that we should instead
abandon the dogmatic constraint and see if we can justify corporate
criminal liability on other grounds.
The remainder of the Article takes up that challenge. Part II relies
upon a team-production model of the corporation and a normatively
expansive conception of the corporate official’s fiduciary relationship to
argue that corporate officials bear moral responsibility for the crimes of
their corporation whether or not they participate in those crimes. In Part
III, I argue that the corporate official’s moral responsibility for a
corporate crime licenses our holding the corporation criminally liable,
and I identify a series of sanctions that could direct our outrage in the
face of corporate crimes to the blameworthy corporate official.

I. The Dogma of Corporate Criminal Liability
The debate about corporate criminal liability has centered around
considerations of corporate ontology, as both critics and supporters share
the view that it is the corporation’s features that will either negate or
38
sustain claims that it is an appropriate object of retribution. The
underlying commitment on both sides of the debate is, then, the notion
39
that corporate ontology is destiny. Yet, as I shall argue in Part I.A,

on considerations of efficiency. See, e.g., Fischel and Sykes, supra note 34, at 320.
38. Kip Schlegel puts the matter thus: “[T]he propriety of allocating punishments to the corporations
themselves according to blame depends, quite clearly, on whether these corporate offenders can ever
be considered blameworthy to begin with.” Schlegel, supra note 35, at 76; see also Michael J. Phillips,
Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of the Corporation, 2 Bus. Ethics Q. 435, 436
(1992) (“[T]he presence or absence of corporate moral personhood determines whether corporations
are subject . . . to blame for their failure to meet [their moral] obligations.”).
39. Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Sanctioning Corporations, 19 J.L. & Pol’y 15, 18–19 (2010). Dan-Cohen
has noted that the debate about criminal liability is also plagued by misleading ontological
presupposition. Id. More specifically, he argues that the debate is beset by an “assumption of
individuality” according to which “corporations are punishable if and only if punishing them would
amount to or be the equivalent of punishing individual human beings.” Id. at 18. Dan-Cohen goes on
to argue against the assumption by disaggregating two questions: first, whether corporations should be
subject to the government’s coercive power when they commit a criminal offense, and second,
whether, in exercising that coercive power, the government should be subject to the evidentiary,
substantive and procedural constraints that limit governmental coercion of individuals. Id. at 19. DanCohen answers the first question in the affirmative, but the second in the negative, on the ground that
corporations lack the dignity in virtue of which coercive action must be constrained when directed at
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questions about corporate ontology are likely irresolvable. It is because
the debate about corporate criminal liability has focused on these
questions, I conclude, that it has been doomed to intractability.
In Part I.B, I argue that we should abandon the dogmatic focus on
corporate ontology because it is unnecessary and undesirable. More
specifically, I contend that there is no reason to think that the
justifiability of corporate criminal liability must turn on the corporation’s
ontological status. The doctrine could instead be understood as
40
embodying a form of shared rather than collective responsibility. In
other words, it is possible that the doctrine targets the corporation
because its members deserve punishment and not because it does. I seek to
motivate that possibility by noting that often we experience more
outrage in the face of corporate crime than can legitimately be aimed at
the crime’s individual perpetrators. I suggest that this surplus outrage
might stem from a legitimate sense that there are members of the
corporation who deserve blame for its crime even though they didn’t
participate in it. I thereby set the stage for a theoretical defense of the
claim that corporate officials are morally responsible for any corporate
crime, which I undertake in Part II.
A. Corporate Ontology as Destiny
Corporate criminal liability has its genesis in an extension of civil
41
law’s doctrine of respondeat superior to the criminal law. But respondeat

individuals. Id. at 30–35. I find Dan-Cohen’s account deeply nuanced and appealing and, among those
theorists who attempt to draw an ontological distinction between the individual and the corporation,
Dan-Cohen’s account must surely rank with the best. But it requires that one embrace a Kantian
transcendental notion of human dignity and, as such, is not likely to provide a ready resolution to the
debate I describe in this Part, since many of the participants in the debate do not share Dan-Cohen’s
Kantian commitments.
40. On an account of collective responsibility, at least some part of the responsibility of a
collective cannot be distributed to the collective’s members but must instead rest with the collective
itself. See, e.g., David Copp, On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from
“Normative Autonomy,” 30 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 194, 211 (2006); Feinberg, supra note 6,
at 677. See generally George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The
Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 Yale L.J. 1499 (2002). For the view that at least some of the
responsibility for a collective wrong must rest with the collective itself, see, for example, Tracy Isaacs,
Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective Intention, 30 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 59, 62
(2006). For some seminal works on collective responsibility, see generally David Cooper,
Responsibility and the “System,” in Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My
Lai 86 (Peter A. French ed., 1972); Peter A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility
(1984); Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility 129 (2000); Philip Pettit, Responsibility
Incorporated, 117 Ethics 171, 177 (2007); see also infra notes 42, 45–47, 55–58. On an account of
shared responsibility, the members of a group will bear responsibility for at least some group acts in
which they did not participate. See generally Kutz, supra note 37; Larry May, Sharing Responsibility
(1996); Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 959 (1992).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909).
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superior is a notoriously problematic rationale for criminal responsibility.
Enter attempts to articulate accounts of direct criminal culpability—that
is, accounts arguing that the corporation can be culpable in its own right
and hence deserves to be punished when it violates the criminal law—as
well as rejoinders from the doctrine’s critics that claims of corporate
desert are spurious. I refer to those who contend that the corporation can
deserve punishment in its own right as retributivists, and those who deny
this contention, typically on the ground that a corporation is nothing
43
other than a nexus of contracts, as reductionists.
Generally speaking, there are two points of departure for a
retributivist defense of corporate criminal responsibility. First, one can
invoke our practices of assigning responsibility and argue that, because
we treat corporations as morally responsible, corporations must be moral
agents—that is, the kind of entities that can bear moral, and hence
criminal, responsibility. Second, one can tackle the issue from the other
direction by arguing that corporations possess the kind of features that
44
can sustain ascriptions of moral responsibility.
This second alternative can itself take one of two forms. The first
elides the question of moral agency altogether and argues that features of
45
corporate organization ground blame and, hence, criminal responsibility.
The second seeks to argue that the corporation possesses capacities that
would qualify it for moral agency, and hence suit it for moral
46
responsibility. In this Part, I first address practice-based accounts and
then turn to organizational and capacity-based accounts.
42. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees: Considering Fault-Based
Liability for the Complicit Corporation, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1343, 1360 (2007) (“Respondeat
superior . . . is an infirm theory on which to base criminal punishment.”). Cf. Weissman & Newman,
supra note 19, at 411–14 (2007) (arguing that federal corporate criminal law, which embodies a
vicarious responsibility rationale, ought to be revised to include “an additional criminal element that
the corporation failed to have reasonable policies and procedures to prevent” the commission of the
crime).
43. Though the term “reductionist” might be pejorative in some contexts, it is routinely used
neutrally in the debate over corporate personhood to describe those who deny the real existence of the
corporation. See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 39, at 18. The poles in this debate have also been
described as realist and nominalist. See, e.g., Eric Colvin, Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability,
6 Crim. L.F. 1, 2 (1995); Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From
Adaptation and Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev.
641, 680 (2000). See generally David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians,
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1373 (1993).
44. Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite advance both strategies in their defense of corporate
criminal liability. See Fisse & Braithwaite, Allocation, supra note 28, at 482–88.
45. Cf. David Luban, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman, Moral Responsibility in the Age of
Bureaucracy, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2348, 2367–77 (1992) (classifying defenses of corporate moral
responsibility as rooted in the corporation’s structure, culture, or capacity to encourage evil-doing, and
rejecting all three).
46. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655, 658
(1926) (“[B]efore anything can be a jural person it must intrinsically possess certain properties, the
existence of which is necessary to constitute anything a person.”).
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Practice-Based Accounts of Corporate Criminal Responsibility

Proponents of corporate moral responsibility sometimes argue that
our practices of assigning moral responsibility to corporations establish
that corporations are appropriate bearers of these assignments—in short,
that they are moral agents. These theorists take such discourse about the
48
corporation at face value. Samuel Buell, for example, asserts that these
ascriptions of blame to entities “show that we understand entities . . . to
49
be responsible for consequences of actors’ conduct.” Lawrence
Friedman infers from the tendency to speak of corporations as “‘real’
50
entities . . . in moral discourse,” that the “corporation qua corporation
can suffer moral condemnation for its wrongdoing through criminal
51
conviction and punishment.”
The problem with these statements is that they are irremediably
52
ambiguous. It may be that sometimes we exhaust our emotional
responses to an entity’s wrongdoing by aiming these responses only at
the entity. Think here of indignation directed at corporations that
employ child laborers: We appear to be content to vilify, say, The Gap,

47. The claims addressed in this Subpart seek to establish that our practices of holding groups
morally responsible entail that they are morally responsible. Dan Kahan appeals to our practices of
blaming corporations in an effort to defend corporate criminal responsibility but elides the question of
whether the corporation deserves punishment. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 35, at 618–19. Instead, his
point is that our practices reveal the social value of corporate criminal responsibility—a value that is
overlooked, according to him, by economists who focus only on the material costs and benefits of
corporate criminal responsibility. Id. at 610, 619–22. While I agree that society values punishing
corporations, I believe that we should indulge this value only if corporations deserve punishment.
48. Cf. Fisse & Braithwaite, Corporations, supra note 28, at 847 (1993) (“It is not a legal fiction
for the law to hold corporations responsible for their decisions; in all cultures it is common for citizens
to do so. When the law adopts these cultural notions of corporate responsibility, it does more than
reflect the culture; it deepens and shapes the notions of corporate responsibility already present in the
culture.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We
Identify a Corporate Morality?, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1645, 1652 (2002) (citing as inconclusive evidence for
the view that the corporation possesses its own morality the fact that we hold the corporation itself to
account when it acts badly, and that we aim our opposition to corporate actions at the corporation
itself).
49. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L.J. 473, 492
(2006).
50. Friedman, supra note 22, at 847 (quoting Eric Colvin, Corporate Personality and Criminal
Liability, 6 Crim. L.F. 1, 24 (1995)).
51. Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
52. Indeed, reductionists and retributivists disagree about whether we intend these statements to
be taken at face value or instead whether we deploy them as a shorthand for responsibility we intend
to assign to the corporation’s individual members. Compare Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations
Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, Bus. & Prof’l Ethics J., Spring 1983, at 13 (“To
say that a corporation is morally responsible for some wrongful act, then, is but an elliptical way of
saying (if what one is saying makes sense) that some people within the corporation are morally
responsible for the act . . . .”), with Kevin Gibson, Fictitious Persons and Real Responsibilities,
14 J. Bus. Ethics 761, 761 (1995) (“I contend that it also makes sense to say that the corporation is
itself a moral agent, so that the claim that it is praiseworthy or blameworthy is not always reducible to
a claim about the acts of members of the corporation.”).
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Inc., without seeking to transmit all (or even any) of our indignation to
53
those who are members of that corporation. Similarly, we are inclined
to lay blame with groups themselves when the harm they cause results
from features endemic to the structure or organization of the group itself,
over which no individual member has control.
In other instances, however, we are not content to have the buck
stop at, or even rest with, the collective. Indeed, we view the collective
front with suspicion—as a spurious tool with which to shield the
individuals who orchestrated or otherwise contributed to the harm. For
example, I doubt that anyone who reviles the Nazi SS for the atrocities it
committed means to have any part of that response rest with the
institution itself. Though we may here refer to the collective, it is only the
members themselves whom we really seek to blame. In the corporate
context, this insight has found its way into doctrine, as courts impose
liability upon a corporation’s owner where they view the corporation as
54
nothing other than her alter ego.
The ambiguity in statements in which we blame the corporation, or
appear to be blaming the corporation, arises because of an obvious, but
often unremarked, difference between corporations and individuals. In
the case of individuals, the buck must stop with them—there is no part of
the individual that is itself a moral agent and could thus qualify for an
55
assignment of moral responsibility. By contrast, collectives are
comprised of members who are themselves moral agents. We cannot
discern, then, from the face of our practices of blaming collectives (to the
extent that we do blame them) whether we mean that the collective itself
is responsible or instead whether we invoke the collective as a shorthand
way of referring to those members who bear responsibility in its stead.
We should adopt the collectivist’s interpretation of these practices, then,
only if there are independent grounds for thinking that collectives
possess the kind of features that justify our holding them morally
responsible. It is to a consideration of these features that I now turn.
2.

Organizational-Based Defenses of Corporate Criminal Liability

Some theorists have sought to defend corporate criminal liability by
pointing to features internal to the corporation rather than to our
discourse about it. Two strategies arise here. First, some accounts point

53. See, e.g., Sidharth Pandey & Anchal Vohra, Global Media Slam GAP for Child Labour
Clothing, NDTV.com (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=
NEWEN20070031262&ch=10/30/2007%209:28:00%20PM.
54. See, e.g., Cheatle v. Rudd’s Swimming Pool Supply Co., 360 S.E.2d 828, 830 (Va. 1987).
55. I am reminded here of the old-school parenting tactic of asking the child-culprit of some
offense, “Which hand did it?” and targeting that hand for the ensuing sanction. That the question and
resulting punishment are ridiculous supports, I believe, the claim made in the text accompanying this
footnote.
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to elements of a corporation’s structure or culture that conduce to crime
and hence allegedly are blameworthy in and of themselves. Other accounts
seek to make out the corporate analogs of the traditional actus reus and
mens rea elements of criminal law. In this Subpart, I confront the first of
these strategies; I take up the second in the next Subpart.
It is an ineluctable fact of group dynamics that the group setting can
both cause people to engage in wrongful acts that they might not have
56
committed otherwise and magnify the effects of the harm caused by
57
these wrongs. Sometimes, the very structure of the group can create
opportunities to contribute to wrongdoing unwittingly, as when the
bureaucracy of a corporation impedes members from knowing what
others are doing, and it is the combination of their actions that produces
58
the wrongful act. This is just the set of conditions that prompted the
59
articulation of the much reviled “collective knowledge” doctrine in
60
United States v. Bank of New England. In that case, the First Circuit
held that a bank could be said to know that withdrawals had exceeded
the level above which reporting was necessary when tellers knew the
amount of the withdrawals in question but did not know the reporting
limits, and other bank employees knew the reporting limits but did not
61
know the amount of the withdrawals. The court found that that the
knowledge of a corporation “is the sum of the knowledge of all of the
employees,” and in that way it was able to impute to the corporation a
62
crime of which none of its individual members was culpable.
In other instances, the group’s culture promotes wrongdoing, and its
members can then rationalize their participation in crime by appealing to
63
the corporation’s interests. For example, Pamela Bucy argues that such

56. See, e.g., John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational
Corruption, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 1177, 1186–92 (2005); Luban, Strudler & Wasserman, supra note 45, at
2356–65.
57. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 1307, 1324 (2003) (“With a
shared identity, performance increases markedly . . . . Conspiracies, which often cultivate such an
identity, therefore can be more productive (and impose greater harm) than isolated individuals.”).
58. Luban, Strudler & Wasserman, supra note 45, at 2365; cf. Kutz, supra note 37, at 150 (“When
we act together, it becomes easy to inhabit an essentially bureaucratic frame of mind, in which ultimate
ends are less salient than the instrumental procedures used to effect those ends.”).
59. David Luban has perhaps the wittiest rejoinder to this definition of collective knowledge,
deeming it “as bizarre as announcing that four fiddlers playing in separate rooms make a string
quartet.” David Luban, What’s Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 43,
70 (1996).
60. 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
61. Id. at 855.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers 101 (1988)
(describing how employees come to rationalize departures from known moral dictates and eventually
to feel that their conduct, if not honorable, is at least morally blameless); Patricia S. Abril & Ann
Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 81, 160–61; Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 Colum.
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things as a corporation’s hierarchy, goals, employee education efforts,
incentive structure, and compliance program constitute its “ethos” and,
64
depending on their contents, can encourage corporate crime. Further,
even those corporate employees who decline to participate directly may
feel sufficiently aligned with the group’s overall mission that they
65
submerge any impulse to oppose the wrongdoing in their midst.
The question for our purposes is whether these features of
organizational life can ground the corporation’s criminal responsibility
66
for its wrongful acts. Bucy argues that the federal vicarious liability
standard should be replaced by a corporate-ethos standard, since the
67
latter better tracks the corporation’s desert. Buell marshals an
68
impressive case for the claim that “institutions can cause harm” and
69
concludes that they “therefore can be blameworthy.”
Legal doctrine reflects these positions. For example, in United States
v. Hilton Hotel Corp., the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that violations of
the Sherman Act committed by Hilton Hotel’s agents were contrary to
the corporation’s stated policy, but nonetheless affirmed a conviction
70
against Hilton. In reaching its decision to impute the agents’ acts to
Hilton, the court relied in part upon features of the corporation’s
organization and culture—in particular, the “[c]omplex business
structures, characterized by [the] decentralization and delegation of
authority, commonly adopted by corporations for business purposes,”
and the fact that the crimes in question appeared to be motivated by a
71
“desire to enhance profits.” Further, the notion that organizational
features can influence criminality has also found its way into model
statutes. The Australian Model Criminal Code, for example, permits
corporate criminal liability, inter alia, where the “corporate
72
culture . . . directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance.”
Bus. L. Rev. 71, 89–90; cf. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul.
L. Rev. 1275, 1329–32 (2002) (“To tell a compelling causation story on this scenario, we must look to
Enron’s organizational culture . . . . At Enron, winning was everything and everything became a
tournament.”).
64. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability,
75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1121–46 (1991).
65. May, supra note 40, at 73; Buell, supra note 49, at 497.
66. Cf. Luban, Strudler & Wasserman, supra note 45 (grounding the responsibility of the
corporation’s members in the structural and cultural features of the corporation that permit its
members to persist in culpable ignorance).
67. Bucy, supra note 64.
68. Buell, supra note 49, at 497.
69. Id.; cf. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 63, at 162–65 (railing against the impropriety of an
“individual-oriented paradigm” for determining corporate scienter and proposing a multifactor test for
corporate mens rea that would make the corporation guilty of securities fraud if its culture promoted
the fraud).
70. 467 F.2d 1000, 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1972).
71. Id. at 1006.
72. Austl. Model Criminal Code §§ 501.2, 501.3.1 (2009).
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Notwithstanding the increasing acceptance of organizational bases
73
for criminal liability, the fact that a corporation’s structure or culture
can contribute to its engaging in criminal activity does not entail that the
corporation deserves prosecution and punishment. A corporation’s
structure or culture is a ground of its culpability only if the corporation
itself is responsible for its structure or culture—that is, only if the
corporation is the kind of entity that can bear responsibility in the first
74
place. In this way, organizational accounts, like practice-based accounts,
are parasitic on capacity-based accounts: Whether or not a corporation
deserves punishment in virtue of its structure or culture—like the
question of whether or not corporations are referents of the statements
in which we predicate blameworthiness of them—turns on the nature of
the corporation’s capacities. It is to capacity-based accounts that I now
turn.
3.

Capacity-Based Defenses of Corporate Criminal Liability

Debates about corporate personality tend to take a dichotomous
view of the issue, with the corporation alternately described as real or
75
76
fictive; an association or an aggregation; a distinct entity or a nexus of
77
78
contracts. Yet the matter is much less stark than these debates convey.
On the one hand, the corporation is an irreducibly distinct entity—that
79
is, it exists over and above the individuals who constitute it. The fact
that the corporation persists through turnover in its individual

73. See, e.g., Abril & Olazábal, supra note 63, at 165.
74. Cf. Luban, Strudler & Wasserman, supra note 45, at 2373–75 (arguing that it might be useful
to identify organizational features conducive to crime for purposes of explaining how corporate crime
occurs and locating areas where change is needed, but that this identification does not entail anything
about the corporation’s moral agency).
75. Cf. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253, 260–62 (1911)
(defending the view that corporations are real entities insofar as they exist over and above the
individuals constituting them, but are fictive persons because they enjoy personhood only by virtue of
law). Compare McCabe v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 13 F. 827, 830 (N.D. Iowa 1882) (arguing that the
corporation is a creature of law and so exists only in the state of incorporation), with Petrogradsky
Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 170 N.E. 479, 482 (N.Y. 1930)
(“[E]ven in the absence of a charter or other token of the will of government there are groups so
natural and spontaneous as to evoke legal recognition of a corporate existence.”).
76. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 40, at 1549.
77. See supra note 43.
78. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1989) (arguing that the nexus-of-contracts theory,
developed in the 1970s, is not a novel understanding but instead one moment in a two-century-long
history in which managerialist and reductionist conceptions of the corporation have alternately gained
prominence).
79. Cf. Charles C. Abbott, The Rise of the Business Corporation 15 (1936) (“[A] group of
persons organized as a corporation constitutes a whole which is greater than the sum of its parts. In the
same way that a house is something more than a heap of lumber and an army something more than a
mob it is urged that a corporate organization is something more than a number of persons.”).
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80

constituents demonstrates as much. Nonetheless, mere existence is a far
81
cry from moral agency.
There is good reason for skepticism about the corporation’s moral
agency, not least of all because moral agency at least arguably requires a
capacity for the moral emotion, and it is doubtful that the corporation
possesses this capacity. More specifically, on at least one established
account of moral agency, only those who can experience guilt and
82
remorse can bear moral responsibility, and this is so for at least two
reasons. First, moral agency presupposes a capacity to appreciate right
and wrong, and that capacity in turn requires not only recourse to moral
rules but also a rich sense of compassion and moral imagination. In
particular, only by imagining what one’s contemplated course of conduct
will feel like from the perspective of those it affects can we discern that
83
conduct’s propriety. Second, the expressions of resentment and
indignation that are constitutive of blaming make sense only if the target
of these expressions can be made to feel bad about the blamed conduct.
Put differently, the point of censure is not just to condemn the wrong but
84
also to inflict upon the wrongdoer the pain of disapprobation.

80. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Oxford, Definition & Theory in
Jurisprudence, Inaugural Lecture at the University of Oxford 17–18 (May 30, 1953) (“[E]ven if all the
members and servants of the Company are dead there are yet conditions under which it is true to say
that the Company still exists . . . . ”). For a more skeptical view of whether the corporation exists as a
“thing” in its own right, see John Hasnas, Where Is Felix Cohen When We Need Him?: Transcendental
Nonsense and the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, Brook. J.L. & Pol’y (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 16–17), available at http://faculty.msb.edu/hasnasj/GTWebSite/Cohen.pdf.
81. A word about terminology: The term “agent” is sometimes used to describe one who acts on
behalf of another, and at other times used to refer to one who can act of his own accord, or act
intentionally. I adopt the latter use throughout. By “moral agent,” I shall refer to the agent who is
capable of acting in a manner fitting for ascriptions of moral responsibility.
82. There is general agreement among philosophers of responsibility that a responsibility
assignment crucially involves the reactive attitudes. Debate remains, however, about whether the
reactive attitudes are constitutive, or instead merely corollaries, of a responsibility assignment. See
Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in
Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology 256, 257
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). I do not stake a position on that debate here.
83. Steven Walt and Bill Laufer contend that a capacity to discern right and wrong is necessary
for criminal responsibility, but a capacity for emotion is not. Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why
Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 Am. J. Crim. L. 263, 276–
77 (1991). For the reasons adduced in the text accompanying this footnote, they unduly ignore the
relationship between these two capacities. In any case, Laufer, at least, appears to have acknowledged
a greater role for the emotions in determining desert. In a later article, Laufer and his coauthor, Alan
Strudler, acknowledge that corporations are likely incapable of remorse. William S. Laufer & Alan
Strudler, Corporate Crime and Making Amends, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1307, 1317 (2007). Though
Laufer and Strudler do not conclude that corporations are therefore inappropriate targets of criminal
law, they do contend that we should not assume that a corporation’s outward displays of contrition
reflect anything like the change of heart that diminishes the warrant for retribution in the case of
individuals. Id. at 1316–17.
84. Susan Wolf argues that a capacity for emotion is necessary for moral responsibility since
emotion provides the motivation necessary to ensure that one abides by moral rules. Wolf, supra note
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It is likely because a capacity for emotion is so central to moral
agency that opponents of corporate criminal liability frequently note the
85
corporation’s inability to experience guilt. Yet proponents of the
86
doctrine do not appear to have sought to argue to the contrary, and no
87
wonder. Where would a capacity for corporate emotion reside? Where
is the corporate heart that would swell with compassion at the misery of
others? What is the corporate analog of the pit of the stomach in which
we experience guilt upon recognizing that we have acted wrongfully?
What is the locus of the corporation’s shame?
I mean for these rhetorical questions to be persuasive but not
necessarily decisive. One could just deny that a capacity for emotion is in
88
fact a prerequisite for moral agency. But the denial would call attention
to a more general problem with attempts to argue for or against the
corporation’s moral agency: The endeavor presupposes agreement on
the conditions necessary and sufficient for moral personhood. There is
no consensus on what it takes to qualify for membership in the class of
moral persons, let alone moral agents. (The intractability of the abortion
89
debate should demonstrate at least that much.) Moreover, even for

16, at 278–79. Thus, she argues, “[I]t seems inappropriate to regard sociopaths as wholly morally
responsible agents. It seems wrong, in particular, to blame them . . . for failing to constrain their
behavior according to rules they are incapable of being motivated to obey.” Id. For Wolf, then,
emotion is not necessary for discerning right and wrong, as I argue it is; instead, emotion is necessary
for securing the motivation necessary to obey rules that, according to her, sociopaths (and,
presumably, others like them) have within their grasp. Id.
85. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 1, at 1392 (“[A]ttributing blame to a corporation is no more
sensible than attributing blame to a dagger, a fountain pen, a Chevrolet, or any other instrumentality
of crime.”); Khanna, supra note 19, at 1494 & n.91.
86. Peter French alleges that the corporation can experience regret, but that regret, as he
characterizes it, is not an emotional experience but instead an intention to avoid like behavior in the
future. French, supra note 40, at 164–66. Without the emotional experience of regret it remains
mysterious that one could discern what constitute like behavior. In any case, regret is a far cry from
remorse. Alan Strudler, for example, posits regret as the reactive attitude appropriately experienced
by one who has caused harm without fault. See Alan Strudler, Mass Torts and Moral Principles,
11 L. & Phil. 297, 322–25 (1992).
87. There is philosophical literature on the possibility of collective emotions, though it is
unpersuasive for reasons I have adduced elsewhere. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Group
Transgressions 82–85 & 90–92 (Dec. 16, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown
University) (on file with Georgetown University Library).
88. Fisse and Brathwaite, for example, suggest that the corporation might be especially wellsuited to moral responsibility precisely because it lacks the capacity for affect and can therefore
exercise judgment unclouded by emotion. Fisse & Brathwaite, supra note 28, at 30–31. It is not clear,
however, that rational choice devoid of emotion in fact conduces to good moral judgment. One is
reminded of Hannah Arendt’s characterization of the typical Nazi functionary who “does not regard
himself as a murderer because he has not done it out of inclination but in his professional capacity.
Out of sheer passion he would never do harm to a fly.” Hannah Arendt, Organized Guilt and
Universal Responsibility, in The Portable Hannah Arendt 146, 154 (Peter Baehr ed., 2000). Pure
rationality, it would thus seem, can lead to the most egregious conduct.
89. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (“When those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary,
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those criteria of moral agency where there is widespread agreement—for
example, that moral agency requires a capacity for belief or intentions—
there is deep disagreement about whether the corporate versions of these
90
capacities suffice. And that disagreement rests, in turn, on debates
about the adequacy of functionalist theories of the mind—debates that
91
date back to Aristotle and have continued vitality today. In short, it is
foolhardy to think that white-collar-crime scholars can make progress on
questions that have confounded philosophers of mind for millennia. If
corporate ontology is destiny, as the dogma holds, then it is no surprise
that the doctrine of corporate criminal liability remains a “black hole”
92
more than 100 years after its inception.
4.

Summary

This Subpart began by surveying three different strategies theorists
have invoked in support of the claim that corporations are moral agents.
First, I considered the fact that, in common parlance, we blame
corporations, and found this fact to be inconclusive, since we might mean
not that the corporation is itself blameworthy but instead that some or all
of the individuals who together constitute the corporation are
blameworthy. I next turned to accounts that ground the corporation’s
purported blameworthiness in its structure or culture, and found that
these accounts—like the discourse-based accounts we considered first—
presupposed the corporation’s moral agency, rather than proved it.
Corporate moral agency could be defended, then, only by an account
that established that the corporation possessed the capacities necessary
and sufficient for moral agency. I argued that there is no settled view on
what capacities these are, let alone whether the corporation possesses
them. It appears, then, that on the terms of the dogma holding that
corporate ontology is destiny, the debate about corporate criminal
liability is a draw.

at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer.”); Amy J. Sepinwall, Defense of Others and Defenseless “Others,” 17 Yale J.L. & Feminism
327, 342–43 (2005) (“[I]t is not at all clear that unborn children do possess the moral worth of persons;
instead this is, manifestly, an area of deep controversy.”).
90. Compare French, supra note 40, at 43 (arguing that a corporation’s capacity to exhibit regret
by changing course when it has transgressed is all one needs for the emotive part of moral agency),
with Thomas Donaldson, Personalizing Corporate Ontology: The French Way, in Shame,
Responsibility and the Corporation, supra note 29, at 99, 109 (expressing deep skepticism that one
could qualify as a moral person if one lacked a capacity for sympathy, as persons do in French’s
conception of them). Compare Wolf, supra note 16, at 278–79 (arguing that a capacity for emotion is
necessary for moral responsibility), with Walt & Laufer, supra note 83, at 276–77 (denying same).
91. See generally Janet Levin, Functionalism, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (Apr. 6, 2009),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/#AntFun.
92. Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and
Sanctions, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141, 1183 (1983) (referring to corporate criminal liability jurisprudence
as “the blackest hole in the theory of corporate criminal law”).
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B. Debunking the Dogma
Because it is so unlikely that one could successfully defend the claim
that the corporation deserves prosecution and punishment in its own
right, critics of corporate criminal liability conclude that the criminal law
should extend only to the individual perpetrators of the corporate crime.
Yet this restriction fails to align with our common-sense reactions to
organizational wrongdoing. As noted in the Introduction, even in cases
where we can identify individual perpetrators, we may still have a reserve
of indignation, arguably because our sense of the wrong exceeds the
responsibility borne by the individual perpetrators.
More specifically, two kinds of cases seem most readily to prompt
our sense that responsibility for the wrongdoing extends beyond the
responsibility we would assign to the individual wrongdoers. First, and
more obviously, are those cases where the amount of harm caused in the
crime’s commission is greater than the amount of wrongdoing we can
assign to individuals within the corporation, even when we contemplate
their culpability in the aggregate. The BP oil spill might well be
representative, insofar as the explosion leading to the deaths of the oilrig workers and to the spill itself appears to have been caused by a series
of errors of judgment and oversight, no one of which alone was causally
necessary or made it more likely than not that the explosion would occur,
93
but which together produced calamity. In such a case, the culpability of
each individual is relatively small, but the disastrous consequence of their
combined contributions is so large as to exceed even the sum of the
blame we would assign to each of them.
A related set of cases arises when the person who carries out the
94
corporate criminal act is individually blameless, and the culpable mental

93. The Obama Commission investigation into the causes of the explosion and oil spill has
identified many missteps, implicating BP, Halliburton, Transocean, and the Federal Minerals
Management Service (MMS). Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling
89–128 (2011). For example, BP made at least four different errors in the way that it plugged the well,
including having used nitrogen foam cement, which is lighter than normal cement. Id. at 100. BP’s
choice of cement was made more risky still because it turned out that the particular nitrogen foam
cement used was unstable, as Halliburton had learned through tests it conducted, but whose results
Halliburton had neglected to convey to BP. Id. at 101–02. Other errors leading to the explosion
included: failures in monitoring, poor maintenance of the equipment that would otherwise have
prevented the explosion, inadequate training of the rig crew to handle an event of this kind, and a
poorly conceived response plan, as well as inadequate oversight by the MMS, which ought to have
noticed the errors in the response plan. Id. at 57, 71, 115, 224.
94. The term “individually blameless,” inelegant as it is, is meant to signal a distinction between
the individual who is culpable in his own right (for example, one who has committed the actus reus
with a culpable mental state) and the individual who is culpable solely in virtue of his membership in
the corporation that has committed a crime. I leave open the possibility that membership can itself
ground blameworthiness, and I seek to make good on this possibility with regard to corporate officials
in the next Part.
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state resides in one or more high-level corporate officials who were
physically removed from that act. For example, in Commonwealth v.
McIlwain School Bus Lines, Inc., a school bus driver ran over and killed
95
a young girl whom the driver had just dropped off. A Pennsylvania
superior court allowed a homicide indictment against the bus company to
go forward in light of allegations that the company had failed to equip
the bus with safety mirrors that would have allowed the bus driver to see
96
the child after she had left the bus. If the bus driver had no reason to
know of the blind spot, then he could not be said to have been culpable
in the girl’s death. Prosecuting him would therefore be inappropriate.
Yet the girl’s death was no mere accident; instead, it resulted from the
company’s cavalier failure to equip its buses with mirrors mandated by
97
Pennsylvania state law. This failure was a criminal omission, and to
prosecute no person or entity would thereby leave some portion of the
98
injury unaddressed. In both McIlwain and the BP disaster, there seems
to be wrongdoing in excess of that which can be assigned to the
individual actors.
But there is a second kind of case—one that has gone relatively
unnoticed even among retributivist supporters of corporate criminal
99
liability. In this kind of case, the crime seems so ineluctably to belong to
the corporation that to prosecute and punish only the culpable
individuals would fail to match our sense of the wrong. The Johnson &
100
Johnson drug recall is exemplary here. Imagine that all of the

95. 423 A.2d 413, 413 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
96. Id. at 418–19; see also John E. Stoner, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide:
Can the Criminal Law Control Corporate Behavior?, 38 Sw. L.J. 1275, 1283 (1985).
97. McIlwain, 423 A.2d at 416.
98. Cf. Commonwealth v. Angelo Todesca Corp., 842 N.E.2d 930, 934–36, 943 (Mass. 2006)
(upholding the conviction of a corporate defendant for vehicular homicide in a case where the
corporation refused to replace the back-up alarm on one of its trucks, despite repeated requests from
the truck’s driver, and the driver subsequently ran over and killed a police officer while reversing the
truck).
99. Most retributivists concerned with a remainder contemplate cases in which no individual is
blameworthy and yet, according to them, the corporation as a whole is culpable. See, e.g., Paul B.
Thompson, Why Do We Need a Theory of Corporate Responsibility?, in Shame, Responsibility and
the Corporation, supra note 29, at 113, 118–19 (“Who is responsible when specialized systems cause
morally unacceptable consequences? Well, it might be the specialist, or it might be the person who
deals directly with the specialist, or it might be some superior officer; but there are convincing reasons
for thinking that none of these people are responsible in many cases. . . . [In such cases,] it is
meaningful to find the system itself responsible. . . .”); Patricia H. Werhane, Persons, Rights, &
Corporations 56 (1985) (“[A]t least in principle, it is possible that there could be corporate immoral
‘action’ that is the result of a series of blameless [individual] actions.”); Gibson, supra note 52, at 762
(1995) (“[I] want to say that there are cases where no individual or group is found to be blameworthy
and yet we want to maintain that moral as well as legal culpability is appropriate[ly ascribed to the
corporation.]”). I doubt that these cases are coherent. In any event, my concern is with cases where the
crime redounds to both the individual wrongdoers and the corporate officials, and I argue that every
instance of corporate crime is such a case.
100. See Mina Kimes, Why J & J’s Headache Won’t Go Away, CNN Money (Aug. 19, 2010, 7:47
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employees involved in the contamination of the recalled drugs and all of
the executives who were charged with overseeing and ensuring the safety
of the drug production have been identified. If only these individuals
were prosecuted and punished, one might well feel as if something were
amiss. In particular, targeting only the individual wrongdoers would
imply that the offense is exclusively theirs. But Johnson & Johnson is in
the business of serving the health and safety of consumers. If its drugs are
adulterated, some blame for the offense seems to extend beyond the
101
If that is right, then
blame borne by the individual offenders.
someone—or something—should be punished in response to this
additional blameworthiness.
It is worth noting that the insight about surplus blame is not lost on
corporate officials. They seem to recognize that they are bearers of
blame where some of their employees engage in wrongdoing on the
corporation’s behalf, and they have developed a robust culture of
apology as a result. Paradigmatic here is the Japanese ritual of shintai
ukagai, in which corporate officials bow in apology, and sometimes even
submit letters of resignation, in response to corporate wrongdoing,
102
independent of their participation in that wrongdoing. And American
executives hardly recoil from an apology practice either, issuing
statements of remorse for such wrongs as prohibiting airplane passengers
103
from breastfeeding while on board, contributing corporate funds to
104
support the election of a politician opposed to gay rights, engaging in
105
unspecified “wrongs” that contributed to the 2008 economic meltdown,
106
and producing the worst environmental disaster in American history.
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/18/news/companies/jnj_drug_recalls.fortune/; supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Drug Company Tried to Buy Up Defective Motrin Before Recall,
Star Tribune.com (May 27, 2010), http://www.startribune.com/nation/95075064.html (“It is a moral
outrage for a company specifically marketing its products for children to allow a culture of neglect and
irresponsibility to taint the medicines that parents and physicians trust to help children get well.”
(quoting Rep. Darrell Issa)); see also Heavey, supra note 13 (“When a parent gives her child a Tylenol
Product or other children’s medicine produced by Johnson & Johnson, they are relying on the 120year-old reputation of a company who claims that it puts ‘the needs and well-being of the people we
serve first.’” (quoting Rep. Darrell Issa)).
102. See, e.g., Jeff Kingston, Toyota Bows and the Japanese Art of Apology, BBC News (Feb. 10,
2010, 3:20 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/8508531.stm (describing the various
cultural meanings of bowing, and noting that Toyota President Akio Toyoda was criticized for failing
to demonstrate sufficient humility in the press conference he gave apologizing for Toyota’s brake
problems); see also Jon P. Alston & Isao Takei, Japanese Business Culture and Practices: A
Guide to Twenty-First Century Japanese Business 40 (2005); Boye De Mente, Japanese
Etiquette & Ethics in Business 172–73 (5th ed. 1987).
103. See Mesa Air Group Comments on Breastfeeding Incident, PR Newswire (Nov. 17, 2006),
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/11-17-2006/0004477112.
104. Brian Bakst, Target Apologizes for Political Donation to Group Supporting Anti-Gay
Candidate, Huffington Post (Aug. 5, 2010, 6:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/05/
target-apologizes-for-pol_n_672167.html.
105. Graham Bowley, $500 Million and Apology from a Bank, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2009,
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The foregoing suggests that we need not understand the public’s
impulse to see the corporation suffer as the raving delusion of a seething
mob that unduly anthropomorphizes the corporation, as some
107
reductionists do. Instead, we may well rage against the corporation
because we intuit that the corporation’s crime ramifies beyond those who
bear individual culpability for it. Correspondingly, corporate officials
might take on blame themselves, as when they issue apologies, because
at some level they understand that any act of the corporation is, in some
sense, an act of theirs.
In the next Part, I seek to articulate a theoretical basis for these
inchoate sentiments. But first I should note that while these sentiments
may be most readily activated in cases like the BP oil spill or the Johnson
& Johnson recall, we should not therefore conclude that these are the
only kinds of cases in which corporate officials who did not participate in
the corporate crime might nonetheless bear blame for that crime.
Instead, for the reasons I articulate in Part II, every case in which a
corporation commits a crime is a case in which there is a “remainder.” If
the crime genuinely can be imputed to the corporation, then the senior
executives and directors of the corporation necessarily deserve blame
even if they did not personally participate in the crime, and even if we
can identify and convict each of the crime’s participants. The crime
occurred during their tenure, and that alone is sufficient to render them
blameworthy. If I am right, then the reductionist rejection of corporate
criminal liability leaves us with a limp criminal law, one that cannot
respond to corporate wrongdoing without causing remainder.
The prospect of corporate impunity is, of course, the menace that
108
precipitated American corporate criminal liability. Yet the doctrine’s
initial rationale neglected the question of desert, and supporters of
corporate criminal liability have yet to allay the anxiety that the law’s
quest for accountability has imposed liability on entities and their
109
members when the latter, and possibly the former too, do not deserve it.

(Abstracts), at A1.
106. See, e.g., Richard Simon & Michael Muskal, Gulf Oil Spill: BP’s Tony Hayward Apologizes,
L.A. Times Blog (Jun. 17, 2010, 9:17 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/06/gulfoil-spill-bps-hayward-apologizes.html.
107. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 8, at 312; Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Criminal
Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 593, 593 (1988).
108. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1909)
(justifying an application of criminal liability to the corporation on the ground that “the great majority
of business transactions in modern times are conducted through [corporate] bodies,” and too much
mischief would result if the corporation could escape criminal sanctions on the basis of its corporate
form).
109. For the claim that corporate prosecutions unwarrantedly punish innocent corporate members,
see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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In short, both parties to the debate embrace an unassailable truth:
only moral agents deserve retribution. But both also fail to see that the
corporation is not the only candidate for retribution when it comes to its
crimes. Instead the corporation is constituted by individuals, all of whom
at least presumptively satisfy the criteria for moral agency. More to the
point, at least some of these individuals might deserve blame in the wake
of a corporate crime, or so I argue in the next Part.
The debate about corporate criminal liability has too long been held
hostage to considerations of corporate ontology. It is time to release
ourselves from the constricted approach reductionists and retributivists
adopt and see if retribution for corporate wrongdoing can be obtained
when this approach does not hold sway.

II. Corporate Officials’ Moral Responsibility
A requirement of participation is taken to be a sine qua non for
110
moral responsibility and criminal liability. As such, individuals who did
not participate in a transgression of their group tend, on this basis, to
111
deny that they had anything to do with that transgression. Thus, for
example, employee protests in the wake of Arthur Andersen’s
indictment focused on the fact that the company employed 85,000
112
people, the vast majority of whom had nothing to with the Enron fraud.
These denials of involvement may well be compelling in the case of
lower-level employees working in a branch or division other than the one
in which the crime occurred; they do not, however, hold true for officers
and directors. Indeed, the central claim of this Part is that, when it comes
to corporate officials, nonparticipation does not entail noninvolvement
or immunity from blame.
110. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and
International Law, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 251, 252 & n.6 (2009).
111. The tendency can be seen most readily, perhaps, in cases of historic injustices, where none of
the current members of the group were alive at the time of its transgression. Thus, for example, Rep.
Henry Hyde’s blithe quip in response to claims that Americans owe reparations for slavery: “I never
owned a slave. I never oppressed anybody. I don’t know that I should have to pay for someone who
did [own slaves] generations before I was born.” Jeffrey Ghannam, Repairing the Past, 86 A.B.A. J. 38,
70 (2000).
112. See Samuel Loewenberg, Andersen Workers Rally for Embattled Employer, Balt. Sun, (Mar. 22,
2002),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-03-22/business/0203220101_1_andersen-employees-arthurandersen-capitol. In the words of one protester, “A few people did something, and we’re all being
punished for it.” Id.; cf. Hasnas, supra note 30, at 1269 (“Arthur Andersen’s crime, as determined by the
jury, consisted solely of one of Andersen’s in-house counsel recommending that a manager change the
wording of a draft memorandum . . . . ”); Robin Phelan et al., Remember When—Recollections of a
Time When Aggressive Accounting, Special Purpose Vehicles, Asset Light Companies and Executive
Stock Options Were Positive Attributes, 11 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 1, 10–11 (2003) (“What is Arthur
Andersen and who got what they deserved? You know, some secretary in Des Moines that doesn’t
have a job now or some junior auditor in Atlanta? . . . [T]hat’s who got punished.”). For a deterrencebased argument against sanctions that would lead to a firm’s demise, see generally Assaf Hamdani &
Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 271 (2008).
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More specifically, I offer a normatively robust conception of the
corporate official’s fiduciary duties, and I argue that the corporate
official bears moral responsibility for the corporation’s crime in virtue of
these duties, independent of the official’s participation in the crime. The
argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue in Part II.A that the
corporation is a team, or a joint endeavor in which members bear special
113
obligations to one another. Then, in Part II.B, I describe the special
role of corporate officials on this team, the obligations attending that
role, and the ways in which those obligations make the corporate official
a legitimate target of blame for the corporation’s crime.
One preliminary note: It may be that some corporate officials will
have participated directly in the corporate crime; others may not have
participated, but they may have known of and tolerated the crime, or else
they may have willfully blinded themselves to its occurrence.
Contemplating the responsibility these officials bear in virtue of
membership alone is complicated by the fact that they also bear at least
some individual responsibility for the corporation’s offense. To keep
things clean, then, I restrict my focus in this Part to the corporate official
who did not participate directly in the group transgression at issue. We
may imagine that she was not on the scene, did not help to plan or
instigate the crime or to recruit or command others to participate; she did
not have foreknowledge of the offense and was not obligated by her
114
position to have had such knowledge.
A. The Corporation as a Team
A number of corporate law scholars have described business
organizations, and the corporation in particular, as a team. For example,
in a now classic article, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz draw out
115
the team-production elements in all forms of economic organization. In
a similar vein, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have noted that
116
“[m]uch production is performed in teams,” and Margaret Blair and
Lynn Stout have argued that the public corporation is best understood
117
not along a “grand-design principal-agent” model, but instead as a
118
“team production” that “depend[s] at least as much upon horizontal

113. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
114. Compare these conditions with those grounding the doctrine of the responsible corporate
officer. See supra note 33.
115. See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 Amer. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972).
116. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 9
(1991).
117. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L.
Rev. 247, 263 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production].
118. Id. at 263–70.
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119

relationships as vertical ones.” Or, as they put it more succinctly
120
elsewhere, “[a] corporation is a collective enterprise.”
The team-production account of the nature of the corporation is
congenial to the account of responsibility I shall go on to advance,
because it highlights the ways in which the corporation consists of a joint
121
project over which none of its members has ultimate control. Indeed,
economic theorists of the firm identify the inevitable vulnerability of
production in a team setting as the fundamental problem that individuals
122
in a corporation confront; Blair and Stout go so far as to conceive of
this problem as the central rationale for the body of corporate law that
123
has developed.
Yet while I agree that the problem of mutual vulnerability is
foundational, I part ways with the economic account when it comes to
solving that problem. The economists’ solution hews to a self-interested
rational-actor model. The challenge, as they see it, is to curb shirking and
rent seeking among individuals ordinarily motivated by “their own
124
opportunistic instincts.” In contrast, I believe that something loftier
than self-interest can secure group members’ mutual forbearance from
free riding and rent seeking. Blair and Stout gesture to the possibility
that “trust” has a role to play, too, although they acknowledge that
125
“[e]conomic theory has not yet developed a general theory of trust”
126
and that “much work remains to be done” in this area. I am not

119. Id. at 264.
120. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations
of Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1737 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Trust].
121. It may be worth noting that the adherent of a team-production model of the corporation may
be agnostic on the question of whether the corporation exists over and above its members, or instead
whether it is, as the reductionist believes, simply a nexus of contracts. For no matter one’s theory of
the firm, it is difficult to deny the intricate web of interrelationships that constitute the corporation,
and through which it achieves its objectives.
122. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 116, at 9–10 (“So long as no monitor can
determine what each member’s marginal contribution to the team’s output is, each member will be less
than a perfectly faithful representative of the interests of the team as a whole.”); Alchian & Desmetz,
supra note 115, at 779–83; cf. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 117, at 272 (noting that the
parties to a joint enterprise “will each find themselves at the other’s mercy”).
123. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 117, at 287–319.
124. Id. at 271; see also Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 Yale L.J. 698, 702 (1982) (identifying the penalties for breach of fiduciary duties as the force that
will keep the fiduciary in line); Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U.
L. Rev. 1039, 1043 (2011).
125. See Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 117, at 317.
126. Id. at 318. In a subsequent article, Blair and Stout provide an engaging analysis of the social
phenomenon of trust, and they seek to reread corporate law opinions as texts that signal to corporate
officials that trust is due in their corporate roles. Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 120. Nonetheless,
Blair and Stout do not probe the normative foundations of trust. As they acknowledge:
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confident that economic theory can get at the root of trust. In particular,
there is a deep moral foundation for trust, and that foundation sustains,
and informs, fiduciary duty law, as I shall argue in the next Part.
In short, the economic model offers a compelling vision of the
corporation as a team. But that model does not do enough to elucidate
the normative dimensions of team membership. I offer that elucidation
now.
B. Fiduciary Duties and the Ground of the Corporate Official’s
Responsibility
If the corporation is a team, it is not a team in which all players are
expected to contribute equally. Instead, some corporate stakeholders,
like suppliers and consumers, fall outside the normative reach of the
corporation’s joint project; they could not be said to bear obligations to
seek to advance the corporation’s interests. The same might be true for
low-level employees and minority shareholders. Corporate officers and
directors, on the other hand, are deeply implicated in the team; to extend
the sports metaphor, they variously play the role of umpire, rule drafter,
127
coach, manager, and star player. And, in carrying out these roles, they
enjoy a power and discretion that subjects the corporation’s other
members to greater risks and vulnerability than those the corporate
128
officials bear. It is for this reason that the corporate official is bound by
129
a set of fiduciary duties.
But the nature of those duties cannot adequately be captured in the
cramped terms of the economic scholar, at least if the duties are to be

[O]ur approach to the social [science] evidence is for the most part a crude, behaviorist one.
We treat individuals as black boxes whose interior workings are unobservable. . . . But why
do people take account of others’ welfare? . . . Further work on th[is] and related questions
would be immensely valuable.
Id. at 1779–80.
127. Cf. Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board
Accountability, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 541, 542 (2010) (“Although a variety of parties can influence
corporate decisions, courts generally impose fiduciary duties only on corporate directors, senior
management, and certain shareholders.”). Though I do not focus on activist or majority shareholders, I
leave open the possibility that they too deserve blame for corporate wrongdoing on the grounds that I
go on to advance. See generally Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist
Shareholders, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255 (2008).
128. Cf. David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy,
91 B.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1255–56 (2011) (“The inequality and asymmetry within the relationship usually
flows from the fiduciary’s possession of greater expertise or greater information than the beneficiary,
leaving the beneficiary vulnerable to the fiduciary’s predation.”); Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law’s
“Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 921,
926 (2011) (“After lying dormant for some time, fiduciary law experienced a renaissance . . . . ”).
129. See Rotman, supra note 128, at 941–42 (“Fiduciary law exists to protect important social and
economic interactions of high trust and confidence that create an implicit dependency and peculiar
vulnerability of the beneficiary to the fiduciary.”).
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appropriately reflective of and responsive to what is morally at stake
130
when individuals pursue joint action together.
In this Part, I leverage a normatively expansive conception of the
fiduciary duties that officers and directors bear. I seek to elucidate the
moral foundation for that conception, and I spell out some of the special
obligations generated in light of that foundation. The conception of the
fiduciary relationship that I advance here provides grounds for finding
the corporate official blameworthy for a crime of her corporation.
When one thinks of fiduciary duties, one typically has in mind the
particular obligations to which they give rise—for example, duties to
131
132
avoid conflicts of interest and exhortations to act in good faith.
Nonetheless, one can infer from the aspirational nature of the fiduciary
133
relationship a more expansive conception of its normative content. It is
130. Cf. Rafael Chodos, The Nature of Fiduciary Law and Its Relationship to Other Legal
Doctrines and Categories: Fiduciary Law: Why Now? Amending the Law School Curriculum, 91 B.U.
L. Rev. 837, 845–46 (2011). Chodos draws out the distinctions between transactions and relationships.
He argues that the latter subject one or both parties to vulnerability and require “loyalty, integrity,
trust, and faith” as a result, and he conceives of the fiduciary’s role as fitting squarely within his
conception of a relationship. Id. at 845.
131. See Am. Law Inst., Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.02 (2008).
132. See generally Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business Judgment Rule
in Delaware, 2009 Utah L. Rev. 1061.
133. The conception of fiduciary duties at issue here aligns with that embraced by theorists who
view fiduciary duties as mandatory. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 795,
829–30 (1983); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1675, 1682 (1990). See generally Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship:
Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1599 (2000). It
likewise aligns with those who understand fiduciary duties to consist of more than just a set of specific
obligations. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra, at 1694–95. These theorists stand in opposition to theorists of a
more economic cast, who view fiduciary duties as subject to negotiation and waiver. See generally
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). Though I do not seek here to intervene in the
debate between these two camps, I note that others have advanced persuasive arguments for
eschewing a contractarian understanding of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403, 1431–38 (1985);
John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special
Case of Remedies, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 919, 933–36 (1988); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 249–51 (1995); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1554–55 (1989). Indeed,
commentators have noted that, in the exchange between contractarians and noncontractarians, the
latter appear to have won the day. See William W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the
Structure of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1084, 1103–1104, 1119–20 (1993); cf.
Chodos, supra note 129, at 839 (“Contemporary contract law . . . is after all a law of transactions, while
fiduciary law is ultimately a law of relationships.”); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879, 879–80 (arguing that efforts to understand the
fiduciary relationship by analogy to contract law are “insidiously misleading” and “surely mistaken”).
Given these statements, I take it that the position I adopt here is not unduly question begging. It may
also be worth noting in this vein that business scholars have identified the normative content of
fiduciary duties—and in particular the trust they embody—as a key ingredient for corporate success.
See, e.g., Jordan D. Lewis, Trusted Partners: How Companies Build Mutual Trust and Win
Together (1999); Blair and Stout, Trust, supra note 120, at 1740 & n.8. To the extent that
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within this content, I believe, that the ground for assigning responsibility
134
to corporate officials for corporate crime can be found.
At the core of the corporate fiduciary relationship is a kind of selfabnegation. For example, the fiduciary is to “act to further the interests
135
of another in preference to h[er] own.” She “must subordinate h[er]
individual and private interests to h[er] duty . . . whenever the two
136
137
conflict.” She does not just forswear self-interest; she is “selfless.”
138
The fiduciary’s obligations give rise to a set of “expectations” or
139
140
“pressures.” These may be enforced from without, but they also
compel from within. Thus the fiduciary is subject to “internal pressures—
including such internal pressures as a director’s sense of honor; her
feelings of responsibility; her sense of obligation to the firm and its
141
shareholders; and, her desire to ‘do the right thing.’”
Further, fiduciary duties consist not just of specific obligations but
also of a kind of normative penumbra that gives these obligations their

contractarian scholars embrace a shareholder-primacy norm, then, they may have reason to support a
more robust conception of the fiduciary relationship.
134. Kelli Alces has argued that corporate fiduciary duties have been rendered superfluous;
financial incentives have taken their place since these have been deemed more effective at aligning the
interests of corporate officials with those of shareholders. See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate
Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. Corp. L. 239, 258–59 (2009). Alces’s point of departure is a conception of the
corporation according to which corporate officials’ primary obligations go to shareholders. Id. at 245–
48. I am concerned with a conception of the corporation that recognizes the entitlements of
nonshareholding stakeholders—entitlements that sometimes trump those of shareholders. This is a
conception of the corporation that dates back to Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property (1932). See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 849, 850 (2010) (“Those who pick up the book looking for the origins of shareholder primacy
reach the last chapter only to find the shareholders trumped by the public interest.”). In any event,
Alces’s account is positive, not normative. If the 2008 financial meltdown is any indication, we should
not be particularly sanguine about the prospect that financial incentives will best protect shareholder
interests. It might well be time, then, to insist upon the norms and values that have traditionally
infused the fiduciary relationship.
135. Frankel, supra note 133, at 830; see also Bratton, supra note 133, at 1101 (“[T]he ethical
fiduciary abjures self-interested pursuits.”); DeMott, supra note 133, at 882 (“The fiduciary’s duties go
beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the beneficiary’s best interests.”).
136. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (1944).
137. Frankel, supra note 133, at 830.
138. See Bratton, supra note 133, at 1099 (noting that implicit in the ALI’s Principles of Corporate
Governance lies “an assumption that ‘shareholder expectations’ explain and justify corporate fiduciary
law”).
139. See Frankel, supra note 133, at 830.
140. But cf. Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motive of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 8 (2003) (finding
external enforcement mechanisms inadequate).
141. Id. at 8–9; cf. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1013 (1997) (“[A]ll of us internalize rules and standards of conduct
with which we generally try to comply. We do this not only because we may fear some sanction, formal
or informal, but also because doing so is important to our sense of self-worth, because we believe that
doing a good job is the right thing to do.”).
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142

content and force. Thus the duties themselves are often writ large. For
143
example, the fiduciary is to “prefer[] the community to the self” and
144
pursue the “collective good.” Moreover, underpinning the fiduciary’s
encompassing duties is an equally expansive moral vocabulary that
145
defines them in terms of “[l]oyalty, fidelity, faith, and honor” or “the
146
overarching concepts of allegiance, devotion and faithfulness.”
This is all very lofty stuff, and one might well wonder about its
source. It seems clear that the mere concern preoccupying the economist
to deter shirking and rent seeking cannot sustain exhortations to honor,
devotion, and the like. I shall now argue that we can understand the
normatively robust conception of the fiduciary duty in light of a
foundational moral obligation each of us bears to recognize one another.
While I offer a more developed account of the duty of recognition
147
and its role in group settings elsewhere, for these purposes some brief
remarks will suffice. To begin, it is worth noting that the duty of
recognition entails more than mere respect for others’ rights effectuated
through a policy of non-interference. I cannot ignore you and recognize
you at the same time. Instead, recognition requires that I affirmatively
express my awareness of your presence, as someone who is trying to
make her way in the world as I am, and as someone whose ends are not
less valuable than my own simply on the basis that they are yours and not
148
mine. Put differently, I recognize you, at least in part, by getting you to
149
recognize that I recognize you.

142. Cf. Rock, supra note 141, at 1097 (“[F]iduciary duty law evolves primarily at the level of
norms rather than the level of rules.”).
143. Frankel, supra note 133, at 830.
144. Id. at 832.
145. Id. at 830.
146. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1, 26
(2006) (citing Chancellor Chandler’s opinion in In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., No. 411,2005, 2006
WL 1562466, at *24 & n.98 (Del. June 8, 2006)); see Rotman, supra note 128, at 932 (“[F]iduciary law
is premised upon broad-based notions of justice and morality that extend well beyond any
comparables associated with the ordinary laws of civil obligation.”).
147. Sepinwall, supra note 87, at 165–78.
148. Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1981) (grounding restrictions
on individuals’ unfettered pursuit of self-interest on a conception of persons as equally rational and
hence equally deserving of being able to pursue their respective ends).
149. Cf. Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy 139 (1998) (ascribing to Jacques
Derrida the claim that “[t]o pretend, [one must] actually do the thing: [one has] therefore only feigned
pretence”).
I note here that theorists have offered differing accounts of the ground of the duty of recognition.
Some of the literature deals explicitly with recognition, with the seminal work furnished by Hegel in
his Phenomenology of Spirit. But for Hegel, recognition has a self-reflexive aspect—one recognizes
another as a self-conscious subject and thereby comes to recognize oneself as a self-conscious subject.
See, e.g., Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 50–57 (Howard P. Kainz trans., 1994). Given the role that
recognition by another plays in forming one’s identity—and the correspondingly devastating role that
misrecognition can play—the Hegelian notion of recognition has gained prominence in contemporary
works on identity politics. See generally Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in
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The general duty of recognition entails a set of specific obligations
when we do things together, and the team-production account of the
corporation, given its emphasis on the mutual vulnerability of the team’s
members, draws out the need and role for recognition. Individuals come
together in the firm because it is beneficial to enlist others in
accomplishing a particular set of ends. It follows, then, that no team
member can wholly conduct each aspect of the joint activity herself. If
she could, the activity would not be joint in any genuine sense; others’
contributions, to the extent they could make any, would be superfluous.
So it is that each member of the firm relinquishes firsthand control over
the enterprise and comes to depend in part on the others for the joint
enterprise’s success. This is, as I have indicated, beneficial to each, but it
is also disquieting.
Each team member is, in a sense, the source of the others’ disquiet,
and so each is especially well placed to counteract that disquiet by
150
offering assurances of recognition. In particular, the team members—
especially those who operate with the greatest discretion and so put
others at special risk—bear an obligation to convey that they are not in
this alone and solely for themselves. Thus, team membership demands
deindividuation: the team member must act so as to underscore the
softening of boundaries between self and others. We can understand the
corporate official’s fiduciary obligations as a set of duties intended to
express and enact a deindividuated stance: Through these obligations,
the corporate official makes clear that she forsakes her claims to act for
her own sake. That is, she conveys that she is a team member, and this is
151
so in three respects.
First, corporate officials legitimately are subject to an obligation to
152
privilege the interest of the business venture relative to their own. Thus
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 25 (Amy Guttman ed., 1994); Nancy
Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, New Left Rev., May–June 2000, at 107. And, within a more
traditional Kantian vein, there are accounts of respect that resonate with the duty of recognition as I
construe it. See, e.g., Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity 139–40. See generally
Robin S. Dillon, Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect (1995).
Theorists also disagree about whether the duty of recognition ought to emanate from, or respond
to, some universal quality in virtue of which all humans deserve respect or instead from the features
that make a particular person unique. For a developed account of the different forms recognition can
take, see Taylor, supra, at 25. I do not seek to intervene in these debates here.
150. Cf. Richard Holton, Fiduciary Relations and the Nature of Trust, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 991, 993
(2011) (“Some have suggested that trust requires getting the trustee to recognize one’s own
vulnerability.” (emphasis added)).
151. Compare this with Meinhard v. Salmon, in which Justice Cardozo famously identified
something like the duty of deindividuation among partners to a joint venture. 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y.
1928). As he explained, the managing partner “had put himself in a position in which thought of self
was to be renounced, however hard the abnegation.” Id.
152. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 120, at 1782 (“The hallmark of a fiduciary
relationship is the legal requirement that the fiduciary act for the exclusive benefit of her
beneficiary.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in
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corporate stakeholders may seek to insist that corporate officials act with
a certain regard for the corporation to which they all belong—this just is
153
the duty of good faith. Indeed, the law prohibits corporate officials
from seeking to exploit their positions for unauthorized personal gain
154
even when the corporation would not thereby be harmed. Moreover, as
some commentators contend, the corporate official must do more than
155
just pursue the corporation’s ends; she should adopt these as her own.
Put differently, the corporate official should “care for” the interests of
156
the corporation. The corporate official who neglects to view the way in
which her corporation-related activities might impact the corporation
may then rightly be charged with a kind of solipsism that violates the
157
nature of her role.
Second, although corporate officials always retain a genuine right of
exit, the smooth operation of the corporation, and perhaps its success as
well, require that corporate officials psychologically suspend their
158
insistence upon this right. The corporate official should not proceed
with one foot always outside the door but instead with two feet planted
159
firmly within the office she holds. The very origin of the notion of a
fiduciary duty suggests a recognition that the fiduciary and the

Corporation Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629, 634 (2010) (“[I]t has been traditional for the duty of loyalty to be
articulated capaciously, in a manner that emphasizes not only the obligation of a loyal fiduciary to
refrain from advantaging herself at the expense of the corporation but, just as importantly, to act
affirmatively to further the corporation’s best interests.”).
153. See generally Furlow, supra note 132 (arguing that good faith is the state of mind with which
the corporate official enacts the duty of loyalty); Strine, supra note 152 (same).
154. See, e.g., Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 47 (Mass. 2009) (citing Feiger v. Iral
Jewelry, Ltd., 363 N.E.2d 350, 351 (N.Y. 1977), for the proposition that “[o]ne who owes a duty of
fidelity to a principal and who is faithless in the performance of his services is generally disentitled to
recover his compensation, whether commissions or salary. . . . Nor does it make any difference that the
services were beneficial to the principal, or that the principal suffered no provable damage as a result
of the breach of fidelity by the agent”); see also Clark, supra note 26, at 73–74; DeMott, supra note
133, at 888 (noting that the obligation to account arises even when the fiduciary’s unauthorized act
benefits the beneficiary).
155. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 Buff. L. Rev.
99, 103 (2008) (“[T]he irreducible core of the fiduciary relationship is the fiduciary’s obligation to
adopt the principal’s goals, objectives, or ends.”).
156. Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 Del. J.
Corp. L. 27, 45–47 (2003) (emphasis added).
157. Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 899, 908 (2011) (F]iduciary
duty . . . is a duty of unselfishness.”).
158. See generally Dennis J. Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties in
Partnership, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 215 (2004).
159. This is standard advice in work seeking to convey the attributes of highly successful managers.
For example, Rosabeth Moss Kanter of Harvard Business School identifies “strong commitment” as
one of the six “extras” that great corporate leaders possess. Six Extras That Build Power and
Leadership, Harv. Bus. Rev. Blog (Oct. 18, 2010, 11:39 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/kanter/2010/10/sixextras-that-build-power-an.html. She goes on to explain that “people want to be led by committed
leaders, not those whose eyes are always on another project or who make it clear that other parts of
their lives matter more to them.” Id.
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160

entrusters’ fates rise and fall together. As a result, the “fraternity”
created by the fiduciary relationship would be “destroyed if one partner
161
secure[d] himself against all loss.” Self-protection and jumping ship
thus violate the very spirit of the fiduciary relationship.
Finally, righteous indignation is foreclosed to the corporate official
even if she has not participated in the wrongful act or event. She may not
join outsiders in decrying the corporate crime as if she is no more a party
to it than they are. Instead, the corporate official’s loyalty and devotion
162
should prompt her to bow her head alongside the crime’s perpetrators;
163
she should stand in solidarity with them as they are judged. Accepting
responsibility for what she did not do but in which her agency is
164
nonetheless manifest is the “punctilio of [her] honor.”
Interestingly, business scholars who write for an executive audience
discourage finger-pointing in the wake of corporate wrongdoing, and
instead exhort the corporate official to take stock of her own role and
encourage her subordinates to do the same. Thus, for example, Rosabeth
Moss Kanter writes,
One sign of a [corporate] losing streak . . . is finger-pointing in
response to problems, instead of soul-searching. . . . In contrast, the
turnaround leaders . . . put their companies and teams back on a
winning path . . . . They ask[] everyone, whether directly involved with
165
the problems or not, to examine their own responsibility . . . .

160. See Callahan, supra note 158, at 231.
161. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Cf. Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 959,
981 (1999) (arguing that CEOs are like sovereigns and that, as such, they may be “deposed when
things go wrong within the company—even things over which they had no effective control”).
163. Cf. Larry May, The Morality of Groups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm,
and Corporate Rights 82–83 (1987) (positing solidarity as a ground of collective (not shared)
responsibility for the acts of some member(s) of an informal group such as a mob).
164. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Given the emphasis on loyalty and
constancy, one might think outmoded the understanding of fiduciary duties relayed in this Part. An
objector might concede that this understanding aptly characterized the relationship between the
corporate official and his firm a generation or so ago, when individuals spent their entire careers
within one company. But the average management professional today moves between companies
every 6.1 years. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Tenure in 2010, at 2
(2010). Given this much mobility, the notion of a commitment to the corporation, with its attendant
robust obligations, might seem far-fetched—or so the argument would go. In response, it might be noted
that twenty percent of marriages in the United States end within the first five years, and thirty-three
percent end within the first ten years. See, e.g., Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, New Report Sheds Light on
Trends and Patterns in Marriage, Divorce, and Cohabitation, Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention
(July 24, 2002), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/02news/div_mar_cohab.htm. Nonetheless, one is not
therefore entitled to be cavalier about one’s commitment to one’s spouse while one is in the marriage. By
the same token, the fact that a corporate official might well move on to another “team” in a few years
should not entail that she may curb her commitment to her current firm during her tenure there.
165. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Why Blame Makes for Bad Business: Lessons from Arizona, Harv.
Bus. Rev. Blog (Jan. 18, 2011, 10:57 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/kanter/2011/01/replace-finger-pointingwith-s.html.
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It is in light of the corporate official’s fiduciary obligations,
understood as demands of deindividuation pursued in recognition of the
vulnerability to which team production subjects the corporation’s
members, that we are licensed in blaming her for the corporation’s
offense. We might say that the nature of the corporate official’s
responsibility is normative, in the sense that the corporate official is
obligated to accept it. But that responsibility is also moral: For one thing,
as a team production, the corporation consists of intricate networks of
interactions, and we cannot be sure that the corporate official’s
participation in these networks did not conduce, however unwittingly, to
the crime. But more than that, her contributions to the corporation
reflect the way in which her agency is bound up with the corporation’s.
The fiduciary relationship demanded of her effects, or at least ought to
effect, a transformation in her identity insofar as her role within the
166
corporation comes to be among the salient features defining who she is.
She must accept blame, then, not because—or just because—doing so is
implicit in her job description, but because the corporate crime redounds
to her. Accordingly, when the corporate official disclaims responsibility,
167
she does more than betray her fiduciary obligation to the corporation;
she betrays a truth about herself.
Now, what does all this mean for the way we, and the law, ought to
respond to corporate officials whose companies commit crime? And
what is the relationship between their responsibility and the doctrine of
corporate criminal liability? It is to these questions that I now turn.

III. The Rationale, and Appropriate Punishment, for
Shared Responsibility in Corporate Crime
The foregoing has sought to establish that we experience more
indignation in the face of corporate crime than can be discharged upon
the crime’s individual perpetrators, and yet the corporation cannot
absorb this indignation. At the same time, corporate officials who do not
participate in the corporate crime do not deserve individual criminal
prosecution, and yet they nonetheless deserve some blame for the crime
and are required to accept blame on the corporation’s behalf.
In this Part, I seek to move from the moral account of the last Part
to a defense of corporate criminal liability. To that end, I argue in Part

166. Cf. Kutz, supra note 37, at 141 (arguing that the will of each participant is manifested in their
shared project, and thus each participant bears a kind of responsibility for anything untoward
committed in the course of pursuing the shared project); David Enoch, Being Responsible, Taking
Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency at 30 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Author)
(arguing that authentic membership in a group requires that the member “incorporate [the group’s]
actions into her agency by taking responsibility for them”).
167. See generally Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 457, 488–94 (2009) (describing the duty of loyalty as a prohibition on betrayal).
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III.A that corporate officials’ responsibility justifies corporate criminal
liability. In Part III.B, I describe the implications of this justification for
the way in which we sanction corporations and their officials.
Two notes will be useful before proceeding. First, recall that the
paradigm case for the account to be advanced is the case in which there is
an uncontroverted corporate crime. There are many instances in which
an employee of the corporation acts criminally and it is not at all clear
whether her act is ultra vires or instead an act of the corporation. I
suspect that some of the skepticism about an account deeming the
corporate official blameworthy for a crime committed by her subordinate
arises because the skeptic contemplates a case in which it would be a
mistake to ascribe the subordinate’s act to the corporation, and thus a
mistake to assign responsibility for the subordinate’s act to the corporate
official. In other words, the skepticism arises because of a concern about
whether the corporation has committed a crime, and not because of a
worry about shared responsibility. As I stated at the outset, the account
of shared responsibility provides grounds for assigning blame to the
corporate official for a corporate crime; it does not, and does not seek to,
illuminate the circumstances in which the corporation has or has not
168
committed a crime. In what follows, I assume, as I have throughout,
that there is a corporate crime, though I do not seek to defend the
ascription of the criminal act to the corporation.
Second, one might think it problematic to treat the corporate official
generically, as I have thus far, without distinguishing between the relative
blameworthiness of executives holding different positions within the
corporation, or between inside and outside directors. To be sure, a more
fine-grained treatment of the response each corporate official deserves
would be necessary if one were concerned with individual sanctions. The
purpose of the account in the last Part, however, was to provide grounds
for punishing the corporation. Each corporate official bears enough
responsibility, I submit, to license our prosecuting the corporation and
imposing upon it the sanctions I shall go on to describe. Parsing the
relative amounts of blame each corporate official deserves, and
identifying whether and, if so, what individual sanctions might be
169
appropriate is a project that will have to await another day.
A. The Justification for Corporate Criminal Liability
The last Part sought to articulate a moral argument for the propriety
of assigning blame to corporate officials. I argued that the corporate

168. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26.
169. I begin to undertake that project in Amy J. Sepinwall, Making Corporate Officers
Responsible: The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Reimagined (draft paper) (on file with the
Author).
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official is blameworthy, first, in the sense that her fiduciary relationship
requires him to accept blame (normative responsibility). But she is also
blameworthy by virtue of the way her fiduciary relationship causes her
will to become bound up with the will of the corporation such that she
cannot separate herself from it (moral responsibility).
In short, the corporate official is a legitimate target of blame when
her corporation transgresses. But notice that the ground of her blame
does not correspond to the traditional predicates for criminal liability. In
particular, the corporate official can be blameworthy on the account just
170
advanced even if she did not harbor a culpable mental state. As such, it
would be inappropriate and unjust to prosecute and punish her
171
individually. But I do not believe that we subject corporate officials to
injustice when we prosecute their corporation and impose upon the
corporation sanctions whose moral force these officials can be made to
feel.
We can, I submit, leverage the corporate official’s blameworthiness
in order to defend the doctrine of corporate criminal liability: We hold
the corporation criminally responsible in response to our indignation,
and we have the corporate officials bear this indignation to give it force.
In other words, we deploy the prosecution and punishment of the
corporation in order to target corporate officials, who justifiably receive
our outrage on its behalf.
This understanding of corporate criminal liability does more than
simply rationalize corporate criminal liability; it also explicates the
impulse behind it. Our belief that the indignation evoked by corporate
crime cannot be fully discharged upon the crime’s perpetrators arises
because we sense—even if only inchoately—that there are individuals
who did not participate in the crime and yet whose membership in the
corporation nonetheless properly confers upon them some culpability.
While the individuals in question might include stakeholders other than
the corporation’s officers and directors, the demanding fiduciary
relationship of officers and directors makes them especially warranted
targets for our indignation.
In the next Subpart, I contemplate some ways in which doctrine,
through the operation of sanctions, can reflect this justification.

170. For the claim that criminal liability requires a culpable mental state, see, for example, Richard
A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 731 (1960) (“The
proliferation of so-called ‘strict liability’ offenses in the criminal law has occasioned the vociferous,
continued, and almost unanimous criticism of analysts and philosophers of the law.”).
171. Contrast this situation with one where the corporate official has been delinquent in a way that
satisfies the elements of the responsible-corporate-officer doctrine. See supra note 31. Moreover, even
where corporate officials have acted culpably, some commentators have argued that individual
prosecutions would be undesirable. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Fixing
Delaware’s Broken Duty of Care, 2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 319, 332–33.
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B. Corporate Officials’ Responsibility and Corporate Criminal
Law Sanctions
Corporate law scholars have noted that the law’s arsenal of
172
corporate sanctions is undersupplied. At the same time, courts have
already shown remarkable creativity in devising ways to transmit the
sting of a finding of corporate fault to the corporation’s officials.
Consider, for example, the Dalkon Shield case, in which the
pharmaceutical company A.H. Robins was found liable for knowingly
distributing an intrauterine device that posed an undisclosed risk of
morbidity and mortality and that caused miscarriages and death in some
173
of the women who used it. At the close of the trial, the presiding judge
ordered the CEO, the general counsel, and a senior corporate executive
of A.H. Robins—none of whom had been sued individually—to appear
in his courtroom, where he proceeded to sear them for their greed and
174
shocking indifference. Other courts have barred convicted white-collar
criminals from serving on corporate boards—even those of charitable
175
176
organizations —or required them to publish notices of apology. And
in a case involving a remorseful white-collar criminal who had already
compensated the victim of his swindle, a court rejected the prosecution’s
request for a thirty-four month prison term and instead sentenced the
defendant to two years of community service during which he would be
177
required to teach business ethics!
Commentators have sought to enlarge the variety of sanctions as
well, by advocating such things as mandated dilution of existing share
178
a three-strike
value through the issuance of additional shares,
179
corporate death penalty, and “Hester Prynne” sanctions aimed at
180
shaming the corporation itself. The first of these follows from a

172. See, e.g., Mitchell & Gabaldon, supra note 48, at 1655 (“Even at this late stage of corporate
development, we have relatively few and unsophisticated ways of holding corporations accountable for
their bad behavior.”).
173. Morton Mintz, A Crime Against Women: A.H. Robins and the Dalkon Shield, Multinational
Monitor, Jan. 15, 1986, at 1–2.
174. Id. at 5–6. The judge’s comments were later found to be prejudicial, and were thus expunged
from the record. See Barnard, supra note 162, at 1000.
175. See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
176. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & Econ. 365, 385 (1999).
177. Les Perraux, Ad Exec Spared Prison: Ordered to Teach Business Ethics in 1st Fraud
Conviction in Federal Sponsorship Scandal, Toronto Sun, Sept. 20, 2005; see also Zvi D. Gabbay,
Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice Paradigm: Restorative Justice and White-Collar Crime,
8 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 421, 421–22 (2007).
178. Coffee, supra note 28, at 413.
179. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the
Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 942 (2005).
180. Peter A. French, The Hester Prynne Sanction, Bus. & Prof’l Ethics J., Winter 1985, at 19, 21–
22; see also Coffee, supra note 28, at 425, 431; Fisse, supra note 92, at 1141, 1229.
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deterrence-based rationale for corporate criminal liability, and the latter
two turn upon the retributivist conception of the corporation as a moral
person capable of death and shame. In this way, these proposals are
inapposite to the justification for corporate criminal liability advanced
above.
What is needed is a set of sanctions whose sting is directed toward
corporate officials but whose severity corresponds to the magnitude of
their blameworthiness. I believe that the four sanctions below fit the bill.
1.

Corporate Felony Disenfranchisement

In most states, individuals convicted of a felony lose their voting
181
rights and these are not restored until these individuals enter, or
182
complete, probation. In Kentucky and Virginia, convicted felons may
183
be permanently stripped of their voting rights. While others have
powerfully criticized the fairness and constitutionality of these
184
restrictions (rightly, in my view), I believe that there is a corporate
analog to individual disenfranchisement that would not suffer from the
same moral and constitutional infirmities.
To be sure, corporations do not have voting rights. Nonetheless, in
the wake of the decision in Citizens United v. FEC, corporations may
185
spend unlimited funds on independent “electioneering communications.”
Importantly, the rationale for that decision rests not on a finding that
corporations warrant free speech protections in their own right. Instead,
the Court found that restrictions on corporate political speech
constituted impermissible discrimination on the basis of the nature of the
speaker: The worth of speech, the Court intoned, “does not depend upon
the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
186
individual.” Supporters of the decision understand this rationale in
reductionist terms. Thus, sympathetic commentators insist that
“corporations are associations of individuals, and individuals do not lose
their First Amendment rights simply because they decide to join with
181. These states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and South Dakota. See
Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States, Brennan Center for Justice,
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_48642.pdf (last visited December 23, 2011).
182. There are twenty states that restore voting rights after the convict has completed her prison
term, parole, and probation, including Alaska, Maryland, New Jersey, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See id.
183. See id.
184. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial
Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1895, 1902 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts:
Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1147,
1155 (2004).
185. 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010). “Electioneering communications” are defined as messages sent via
broadcast, cable, or satellite and intended to promote a candidate running for election, where the
message is disseminated within thirty days of a primary race or sixty days of a general election. Id.
186. Id. at 904 (citation omitted).
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other individuals under a particular organizational form, whether
187
corporate or otherwise.”
Insofar as the rationale for recognizing corporate free speech rights
rests upon the free speech rights that the members of the corporation
possess, denying the corporation convicted of a crime political speech
rights impairs the political engagement of the corporation’s culpable
members. Commentators have noted that corporate political expenditures
will most likely represent the views of senior managers and directors,
188
rather than those of lower-level employees or shareholders. Thus,
restrictions on the corporation’s ability to engage in electioneering
communications remove one avenue through which corporate officials
might otherwise voice their political preferences. In this way, the
restrictions function as an analog to the disenfranchisement most state
felons endure. At the same time, because the corporation’s members
retain the political free speech rights they enjoy as private citizens, the
proposed corporate “disenfranchisement” does not constitute an
189
individualized punishment. Further, the duration or extent of the
disenfranchisement can be set in accordance with the egregiousness of
the crime. Finally, this sanction cannot be readily transmitted to lowlevel employees or consumers, as corporate fines can, and so escapes the
190
objection that corporate punishment falls on those who deserve it least.
187. Steve Simpson, Citizens United and the Battle for Free Speech in America, Objective
Standard, Spring 2010, at 28; see also Jack Kenny, McCain-Feingold and Free Speech, New Am., Mar.
15, 2010, at 16 (“[C]orporations are made up of people who have constitutionally protected rights.
Nothing in the Constitution suggests that people lose their right to free speech when joined together in
a corporation.”); Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v FEC: The First Amendment Rights of Corporate
“Persons,” ProfessorBainbridge.com (Jan. 21, 2010, 8:35 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-v-fec-the-first-amendment-rights-of-corporate-persons.html
(“[P]eople shouldn’t lose their speech rights just because they exercise these rights th[r]ough the
corporation in which they have invested.” (quoting Larry Ribstein, Is a Corporation a Person?, Ideoblog
(May 22, 2004, 8:56 AM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2004/05/is_a_corporatio.html)).
188. See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Brennan Center for Justice, Corporate Campaign
Spending: Giving Shareholders a Voice 9 (2010) (“[O]ne potential risk posed by deregulation of
corporate money in politics is that corporate managers who were restrained by the PAC requirement
will spend much more money on politics—using the corporate treasury to support their personal
political agendas.”).
189. To be clear, I do not mean to endorse individual felony disenfranchisement, which I take to
be a draconian and unconstitutional response to individual conviction. Nonetheless, insofar as each of
the individual members of the corporation that undergoes “disenfranchisement” retains her political
speech rights, I do not believe that the proposal advanced here suffers from the same flaws.
190. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. While corporate felony disenfranchisement appears
to be an appropriate response to corporate crime, for the reasons adduced in this Subpart, we would
need to exercise care in tailoring the sanction to prevent the corporation from funneling the money it
would have spent on electioneering communications to other avenues through which it could buy
political or legislative influence. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx
Story, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1495, 1499–1500 (2005) (noting, in relation to the McCain-Feingold Act’s
prohibition on independent corporate political expenditures—the prohibition overturned in Citizens
United—that “regulatory restrictions on one type of participation simply channel corporate
expenditures elsewhere”).
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The Corporate Criminal Law Sermon

Suits addressing corporate wrongdoing do not frequently yield
191
verdicts adverse to the corporation, and yet, commentators argue, their
192
power to admonish the corporation is not thereby diminished. More
specifically, judicial opinions can articulate standards of appropriate
193
conduct, and the authority underpinning these opinions can serve to
194
enforce standards articulated elsewhere. Further, when these opinions
castigate parties before the court for their failure to adhere to these
standards, the reprimand can provide a kind of restoration to those
195
harmed by the misconduct, even if the wrongdoers are not subject to
material sanctions.
It is for this reason that Edward Rock has referred to these opinions
196
as “corporate law sermons,” and he has argued “that we should
understand [court-made] fiduciary duty law as a set of parables or
folktales of good and bad managers and directors, tales that collectively
197
describe their normative role.”
All of this suggests that corporate criminal liability confers upon
judges an opportunity to educate corporate officials about the nature and
scope of their fiduciary duties, to excoriate them where they fail to live
up to these, and to lend judicial affirmation to the victims’ view that they
have been wronged. In other words, corporate criminal liability has a
198
didactic and norm-enforcing function. The corporate criminal trial is
the forum wherein the expectation of commitment is reinforced and, in

191. Rock, supra note 141, at 1016; cf. Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 Hofstra L.
Rev. 469, 473–82 (2005) (detailing the generally weak enforcement of corporate criminal law).
192. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Structures of Governance: “Fixing” International Law with Lessons
from Constitutional and Corporate Governance, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 423, 434 (2008) (“To me, the
interesting point to take away from these illustrative cases is the transformative effect they have had
on the primary conduct of directors even though the courts did not, and generally do not, impose
liability on directors.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. Rev.
1253, 1265 (1999); Jonathan C. Lipson, The Expressive Function of Directors’ Duties to Creditors,
12 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 224, 262 (2007) (“[W]e recognize that law—and in particular law made by
courts—can have meaning and social force independent of the ‘holding’ of a particular case.”).
193. Rock, supra note 141, at 1016.
194. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693, 762–63 (Del. Ch. 2005) (castigating Michael
Eisner for failing to adhere to corporate best practices, but refusing nonetheless to find him liable on
the ground that the law demands something less than adherence to aspirational ideals).
195. Cf. Lipson, supra note 192.
196. Rock, supra note 141, at 1016.
197. Id. at 1106. Rock is referring here specifically to Delaware law, but there is reason to think
that if other states saw the volume of cases that Delaware does, they too would be positioned to
provide moral education through their opinions.
198. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 120, at 1796 (“Corporate case law . . . can encourage
corporate participants to internalize norms of cooperation through social framing—providing
information about the social context of relationships within the firm. Judicial opinions unambiguously
communicate that directors are fiduciaries and that fiduciary relationships call for trustworthy (loyal
and careful) behavior.”).
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the event of a conviction, the obligation of corporate officials to accept
blame is given judicial authority.
199
The judicial opinion, where it engages in sermonizing, is then a
200
kind of sanction for the corporate official. Where the corporation is
convicted, or pleads guilty, we can bolster the effect on the corporate
official through a required court appearance and perhaps even through
adverse publicity, as I go on to describe.
3.

The “Icon” Proceeding for Corporate Officials
201

In an effort to effect “reintegrative shaming,” Jayne Barnard has
sought to expand upon a provision of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines that permits a judge to require a corporation’s CEO to
202
appear in court to receive the corporation’s sentence. More specifically,
Barnard argues that the mandated appearance should follow every
corporate conviction and that it should sometimes include the
203
corporation’s directors as well as its CEO.
Barnard singles out the CEO because she is pivotal in setting the
204
corporation’s ethical tone and because she is the public face of the
205
corporation. Directors ought sometimes to be included, Barnard
continues, because they “represent the conscience of the company” and
206
constitute, “collectively, the company’s chief law enforcement officer.”
In short, the CEO and directors are appropriate targets for Barnard
because of their roles and purported causal connection to the corporate
crime through their articulation of the company’s culture or conscience.
Furthermore, Barnard justifies her proposal in light of its deterrent and
207
rehabilitative potential.
As should by now be clear, I am concerned with retribution, and the
argument advanced herein is that corporate officers and directors
deserve some blame for the corporation’s crime. Because all officers and
directors partake of a fiduciary relationship to the corporation, and
because it is this relationship that grounds their responsibility, I see little

199. Rock, supra note 141, at 1016.
200. Geoffrey Miller has proposed that allegations of gross negligence on the part of corporate
directors should prompt a judicial inquiry—that is, “an official investigation into plausible claims of
gross negligence coupled with a public report on the results of that review.” Miller, supra note 171, at
336; see also id. at 336–45. This is an intriguing suggestion, though one less suitable for the paradigm
case I contemplate, in which the corporate official has done nothing wrong in her own right.
201. Barnard, supra note 162, at 965 (quoting John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and
Reintegration (1989)).
202. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5, cmt. n.15 (2010).
203. Barnard, supra note 162, at 963–64.
204. Id. at 976.
205. Id. at 981.
206. Id. at 985.
207. See, e.g., id. at 964, 981.
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reason to distinguish between or among them as Barnard does.
Nonetheless, the details of Barnard’s proposal—especially the opportunity
it provides for the judge to voice the “community’s abhorrence of the
208
crime” —are useful here. In short, the law can solidify the connection
between corporate criminal liability and corporate officials’ guilt by
requiring these officials to appear in court and receive the community’s
condemnation through the judge’s words.
4.

Adverse-Publicity Sanctions for Nonparticipating Corporate Officials

The foregoing sanctions presume that the corporate official has not
contributed to the crime in any culpable way. Nonetheless, there is a
circumstance in which the corporate official who did not contribute to
the crime might come to bear individual culpability in light of her
responses to the completed corporate crime. Most notably, consider
cases where the officials in a corporation refuse to accept a deferredprosecution agreement or a settlement requiring a guilty plea when they
have good reason to believe the corporation is guilty, and it then comes
to be convicted at a subsequent trial. Here, each corporate official is
morally responsible not just for acting dishonorably by shirking her duty
to accept blame but also perhaps for subjecting the corporation to more
209
liability than it might have incurred were it to have cooperated.
In such a case, it may well be appropriate to impose upon the
corporation a sentence that stigmatizes its corporate officials. For
example, the corporation could be required to pay for the publication of
a notice of apology that mentions not just the nature of the crime of
which the corporation has been convicted and the names of any
individuals convicted of the crime, but also the names of the corporation’s
210
directors and officers, along with their titles.
Unlike the preceding sanctions, which are largely symbolic, one
might worry that this sanction will have pecuniary consequences. This
might seem unfair given that, ex hypothese, the corporate official has not
culpably contributed to the crime. But the adverse-publicity sanction, as I
envision it, would apply only when the corporate official has good reason
to know of the corporation’s wrongdoing and yet has declined to
cooperate with a criminal investigation, to the detriment of the
corporation. It does not, in such cases, seem unfair to alert other
corporate insiders, as well as the public at large, to the fact that this
211
corporate official has, in a sense, been unfaithful. With that said, we

208. Id. at 983.
209. Cf. William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds 58–60 (2006).
210. Dan Kahan and Eric Posner advocate something similar, although they do not include a
requirement that the corporation publicize the names of those of its corporate officials who have not
been convicted of the corporate crime. Kahan & Posner, supra note 176, at 385–86.
211. See, e.g., Strine et al., supra note 152, at 645 n.41.
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might require that, before permitting the adverse-publicity sanction to be
imposed, the prosecution establish that the official knew of the crime at
the time she maintained the corporation’s innocence.

Conclusion
We do not need to rely on assertions about the corporation’s moral
agency to arrive at a retributivist defense of corporate criminal liability.
Instead, holding corporations criminally liable can be a legitimate and
appropriate way of discharging our indignation in the face of corporate
wrongdoing—indignation that is not fully exorcised by prosecuting only
the crime’s individual perpetrators.
To hold the corporation criminally liable is to acknowledge and
respond to the fact that there are individuals within the corporation who
are blameworthy independent of their participation in the corporate
crime. In particular, corporate officials occupy a position within the
corporation that forecloses disclaimers of innocence and makes them
appropriate objects of blame. These officials are bound by normatively
robust fiduciary duties, which compel them to recognize that their fates
are interwoven with that of the corporation, and that they rise or fall with
it.
To punish the corporation is to punish these officials. Corporatefelon disenfranchisement removes from the corporation enhanced rights
that its officials enjoy as a result of the corporate form and their positions
within it. The educative and norm-propagating function of the judicial
opinion—and especially the corporate criminal law opinion—provides
judicial enforcement of the requirements of allegiance and honor
demanded by the fiduciary relationship. The corporate-icon proceeding
gives voice to the community’s condemnation. And the publicity
sanction, where it is appropriate, further strengthens the norms of honor
underpinning the fiduciary relationship.
In short, the law need not leave us with a remainder when it comes
to corporate crime. We should visit the full force of the criminal law
upon the crime’s individual perpetrators. But we should also prosecute
and punish the corporation, because doing so appropriately targets the
officers and directors whose fiduciary duties make them legitimate
objects of blame.

